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INTRODUCTION
One of the two major approaches toward the scientific 
prediction of behavior has been referred to popularly as 
the ’’reinforcement” approach. This approach took form in 
the early theory of hedonism. It was later conceived by 
Thorndike in terms of a law of effect. More recently,
Hull has interpreted the reinforcement approach in terms 
of drive reduction. All of the approaches have had the com­
mon factor of an object or stimulus in the environment in 
regard to which predictable behavior takes place.
Another approach toward the scientific prediction of 
behavior has been with the use of the concept of expect­
ancy. This concept was used as early as 1901 by Hobhouse 
(25) in his confirmation-inhibition theory. Others have 
used the term in relation to anticipation and set. Tolman 
(51) and Kreeh (32) have treated expectancy from a cogni­
tive point of view. Brunswick (3) and Lewin (34) have used 
expectancy as a concept more related to subjective probabil­
ity than cognition. Recently, this latter point of view 
has been advanced in probability learning theory by Estes 
(20) and Edwards (1&). The common element among these 
theories is the prediction, on the basis of the subject’s 
past experience, that he will react as if a given event were 
going to take place.
A small number of theorists have endeavored to combine 
the "reinforcement” and the "expectancy" approaches into a 
single theory for behavior prediction. Two current attempts 
at integration are being developed from social learning 
theory (46) and the theories on decision-making behavior 
(9,10,19).
Social learning theory is the approach of primary con­
cern in this dissertation. It is an attempt to combine the 
concepts of expectancy and reinforcement into a theory of 
personality. The four basic concepts in this theory are 
(1) behavior potential, (2) expectancy, (3) reinforcement 
value, and (4) situation. These concepts are combined in 
the following formula:
B *p *x,sl,R a * f ^
This formula may be read as follows: The potential
for behavior x to occur in situation 1 in relation 
to reinforcement a is a function of tKe expectancy 
of the occurrence of reinforcement a following be­
havior x in situation 1, and secondTy, the value of 
reinforcement a in situation 1. (45, P»12; cf. 46, 
p.lOS)
In the social learning theory a behavior potential may 
be defined as "the potentiality of any behavior occuring in 
any given situation or situations as calculated in relation 
to any single reinforcement or set of reinforcements" (47). 
For prediction in the theory, at least two behavior poten­
tials must be calculated so that prediction can be stated
in terms of relative potentiality. Expectancy (E) is de­
fined as the "subjective probability held by the individual 
that a particular reinforcement will occur as a function of, 
or in relation to, a specific behavior in a given situation 
or situations.” (47) Reinforcement value (RV) may be de­
fined as ”the degree of preference for any reinforcement to 
occur if the possibilities of their occuring are all equal." 
(47) Situation is considered synonymous with meaningful 
environment, which is referred to as the "acquired signifi­
cance or meaning of the environment to the individual."
(46, p. £6) Situation is to be contrasted with the concept 
of real or objective world, which is usually defined in 
terms of the agreement among many individuals rather than 
one individual.
It is to be noted that an ampersand was used between E 
and RV in Formula 1. This indicates that it is not precise­
ly known how E and RV may be best combined mathematically to 
predict behavior. Besides the lack of knowledge about the 
mathematical sign, the degree of relative weight or force of 
each variable on behavior potential (BP) is also unknown. 
Moreover, it is unknown as to how variables extraneous to 
E and RV may affect this relative weighting.
In social learning theory, and also in the other ex- 
pectancy-reinforcement value (E-RV) theories, the nature of 
this mathematical relationship is an open field for empirical
investigation. An attempt is made in the present study to 
gaze into this relatively nunsurveyed,f field. In making 
this attempt the present study will presume that the rela­
tionship between expectancy (E) and reinforcement value 
(RV) is a simple multiplicative one. E and RV will be ex­
ternally defined as independent variables. With this basic 
framework, the study will consider what effect age and sex 
of subject, relative magnitude of RV, and increased exper­
ience have on the E-RV relationship. With this point of 
departure it is hoped that some progress will be made in the 
understanding of how the expectancy and reinforcement con­
cepts can be harnessed profitably and smoothly into a 
single point of view.
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BACKGROUND
Economists, mathematicians, statisticians, and psychol­
ogists have all been interested in developing concepts simi­
lar to expectancy and reinforcement value. Their various 
purposes have included the studies of economic value of 
commodities, degrees of belief, human reaction to probabil­
ity theory, level of aspiration, decision making behavior, 
gambling, and personality. Among these different approaches 
the operations for the construct similar to expectancy have 
been variously labeled subjective probability, personal 
probability, psychological probability, expectation, and 
degrees of belief. Operations for the construct similar 
to reinforcement value have been variously labeled utility, 
value, valence, prize (positive reinforcement value), and 
stake (negative reinforcement value).
In the review of the literature which follows, the dif­
ferent approaches to these different concepts will be 
covered from both a methodological and theoretical point 
of view. The operations and theoretical approaches to 
expectancy and reinforcement value will first be reviewed 
individually. Then, approaches will be reviewed which com­
bine the two concepts. Finally, a brief summary will be 
made of the literature which has been reviewed.
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61. Expectancy: the operations*
The first topic to be covered is the operations for the 
concept of expectancy. Eight different sets of operations 
which have been used for expectancy are reported here. Al­
though they vary considerably, all of them are directed to­
ward discriminating a person’s subjective probability that 
a given event will take place.
Choice behavior. A very common measure of expectancy 
is choice behavior under conditions where reinforcement 
value is held constant. Lasko (33) employed this measure 
in his dissertation. The rationale of this measure is that 
behavior varies directly with E when RV is constant. Cran­
dall’s recent studies (11, 12) have emphasized the need for 
RV to be held constant. In his research he found that ex­
pectancy statements or ’’guesses” were higher under some 
conditions of higher RV.
Betting. The use of betting was studied as a measure 
of expectancy by Castaneda (5). A convenient method for 
betting is to see how many coins out of a total of ten a 
person is willing to bet that a given event will occur.
Verbal measures. A number of verbal measures for ex­
pectancy have been used. The most common one is for the sub­
ject to state the score he expects to get. Chance (7) and 
Jessor (29) employed this technique in their research. An 
addition to this method is to have the subject also rate
on a 10 or 100 point scale how confident he is that he will 
make this score. (46, p.170)
Other variations of verbal measures are as follows:
(1) to have the subject rate on a rating scale his confi­
dence of making a given score, which is selected by the ex­
perimenter rather than the subject, and (2) to have the 
subject rate on a rating scale how confident he is of making 
a given score or better.
Rotter, Fitzgerald, and Joyce (47) did a comparative 
study of the three preceding verbal measures and the betting 
measure. One measure was the indication by the subject of 
the score he expected to make on the next trial and, second­
ly, the rating of his confidence of making this score. 
Accuracy and actual expectation were emphasized. The second 
measure was a rating on a 10 point scale of the subject’s 
probability of making a given score exactly. This measure 
was taken separately for a series of six scores on or near 
the mean level of performance. The third measure of ex­
pectancy was a rating on a 10 point scale of the probability 
of making a given score or better. This measure was also re­
peated for six different scores selected by the experimenter. 
The fourth measure was the amount of money (up to a maximum 
of 10 pennies) which the subject was willing to bet that he 
would get a given score or greater. This measure was like­
wise repeated with the same six scores involved in the pre­
vious two measures. After the subjects received experience 
on a digit symbol speed test with the scores controlled to 
uniformity by the experimenter, each of the experimental 
groups was given one of these measures.
The similar results which were obtained were inter­
preted to mean that the four operations were all measuring 
the same thing: expectancy. One notable discrepency was
that the betting technique evoked slightly higher (but 
parallel) measures of expectancy than did the other methods. 
Another notable observation was in regard to the second 
measure of expectancy, where the subject made probability 
statements about making a given score exactly. In this 
measure the sum of the probabilities for an individual sub­
ject was well over 100%. This, of course, violates the 
laws of objective probability.
Level of aspiration board measure. The "bid" or es­
timate of next performance on the Rotter Level of Aspira­
tion Board (44) is closely related to the verbal measures 
just described. The unique aspect of the LOA Board measure 
is that a premium is put on accuracy through a scoring 
penalty for over- or underestimating. The D score on the 
LOA Board is a measure of the discrepency between the sub­
ject’s expectancy and his previous level of performance.
Interview. A fifth measure of easpectancy is the in­
terview. This measure was used by Dean (13) to measure
generalized expectancy, GE, a concept which will be des­
cribed more fully later in this chapter. In Dean’s study 
two interviews and a D score measure on a motor task were 
used to predict the D score on a second motor task. One 
interview was to sample generalized expectancy for success 
and failure. The other interview measure was to sample 
expectancy for success on motor tasks. As was predicted, 
the D score measure on the related task was the best pre- 
dicter of the D score on the final task (r».70). The inter­
view in regard to motor tasks was less predictive (Eta».42). 
The more general interview was least predictive (Eta=.26).
Method of triads. A sixth type of measure is referred 
to as the method of triads. Coombs (&) has made an attempt 
to refine the scaling of expectancy by use of this approach. 
This method permits a ranking of the expectancies as well 
as a partial ranking of the perceived distances between 
combinations of the levels of expectancy which are being 
considered at one time. The result is an ordered metric 
scale of the expectancies. The writer questions whether 
this method is any more reliable or predictive than the rat­
ings on a 10 or 100 point rating scale. Moreover, the writ­
er seriously questions the economy of this technique as 
opposed to the rating techniques already developed by Rot­
ter and his students. A comparative investigation of the 
two methods could answer these questions.
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Since the method of triads seems more valuable in the 
methodology of reinforcement value, the method will be ex­
plained more fully in that section.
Ramsey1s distance approach. The seventh expectancy 
measure is called the distance measure. In 1926 a young and 
brilliant English mathematician, Frank Ramsey, became in­
terested in applying mathematics to "truth and probability” 
(42, p.156-196). In his paper on the topic he made the 
initial steps in developing a theory of behavior based on 
"degrees of belief." This concept, degrees of belief, 
might be equated with Rotter’s concept, expectancy.
In approaching the measurement of degrees of belief, 
Ramsey recognized the difference between mathematical 
probability and subjective probability. He therefore faced 
the problem of measuring degrees of belief through some as­
sessment of the individual. Ramsey rejected measures involv­
ing verbal report because of the "inaccuracies of introspec­
tion." He then rejected "betting" for the following 
reasons: (.1) the diminishing marginal utility of money,
(2) individual differences in eagerness or reluctance to 
bet, and (3) the proposal of the bet inevitably changing 
the expectancies of the subject.
Ramsey s ettled on a measure which seems somewhat novel. 
He proposed that expectancy (degrees of belief) be measured 
as an inverse function of the amount of work the subject was 
willing to do (or distance he was willing to travel) in
*1
in order to secure complete confidence (100$ expectancy).
This approach seems fruitful, but it has some disad­
vantages which Ramsey overlooked. For example, as in the 
case of betting, the measure of the expectancy will most 
surely change the expectancy. Second, Ramsey was unaware of 
personality variables, such as needs for dependency and in­
dependency, which would be apt to influence a person’s 
willingness to go to an outside source for help rather than 
to use his own rational resources. Third, it seems apparent 
to the writer that this measure of expectancy would be high­
ly reliable only when the stakes were high. That is, if the 
decision to be made involved life or death or injury, the 
need for 100$ assurance that alternatives are correct would 
be greater. If the stakes were not high, people would be 
prone to act on less than 100$ expectancy and would some­
times prefer a risky choice situation.
The theory of Ramsey will be discussed further in the 
section on integration of expectancy and reinforcement 
value. At that time the mathematical formulation will be 
presented. Unfortunately, the development of this theory 
stopped short in 1930 with Ramsey’s death.
Objective probability definition. The operational 
definitions mentioned above are generally designed to meas­
ure expectancy as a dependent variable. Independent vari­
ables of expectancy have been set up by Schroder (4&) and
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others by varying the objective frequency of successes (e.g., 
0$, 25%, 50$, lOOjg, etc.). The assumption is made here that 
these differential experience patterns will lead to sizable 
discrepancies in the respective expectancies from subject to 
subject. Unfortunately, the assumption cannot be made that 
the subjective expectancies have a one-to-one relationship 
with these objective probabilities for success or reinforce­
ment. However, Rotter, Fritzgerald, and Joyce (47) and 
Castaneda (5) found empirically that stated expectancies re­
lated so closely to objective probability that the opera­
tion in terms of objective probabilities is undoubtedly a 
useful one. Lasko (33) points to the effects of patterning 
of the reinforcements to explain the variable discrepency 
between expectancy and objective probability.
The methodology of the research in this dissertation 
will vary objective expectancy (12£$, 25$, 50$, 75$, 100$) 
as an independent variable. As described above, a counter­
part discrepent variation in personal expectancy will be 
assumed.
3. Expectancy: the theories and findings.
Now that we have examined eight measures of expectancy, 
let us turn to the theories and research on the concept. The 
literature regarding expectancy theory and research can be 
divided into about four major categories. First of all, 
Rotter and the students of social learning theory are in­
terested in integrating the construct into a theory of
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personality. Second, Tolman, Krech, and others are inter­
ested in using expectancy as the core construct in a general 
theory of learning. Third, people with different purposes 
are interested in understanding the relation between expec­
tancy (subjective probability) and objective probability. 
Fourth, some minor rumblings have begun recently over how 
and whether personal expectancy conforms to the laws of ob­
jective probability theory. In the section which follows, 
these various interests will be discussed.
Social learning and expectancy. Social learning theory 
divides expectancy into two parts, as expressed by the fol­
lowing formula:
E = f (E» & GE ) (2)
si 8i
The formula may be read as follows: ,TAn expectancy
(Es ) is a function of the expectancy for a given re- 
1 inforcement to occur as a result of previous 
experience in the same situation (Efs ) and of 
expectancies generalized from tother i situations 
(GE) divided by some function of the number of 
experiences in the specific situation" (probably 
N _ +  1). (46, p.166-167)
Dean’s study (13), referred to previously, supported 
the formulation made above that generalized expectancy de­
creases over a number of trials. Good (22) and Castaneda 
(6) have indicated the importance of assessing the number 
of previous experiences in a situation for determining 
the effect of new experience.
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Changes in expectancy are negatively accelerated with 
increased experience in the situation. This is expressed 
in the following formula:
A E* = f (0 - E) or f (1 - E) (3)
H N
This formula may be interpreted as follows: the increment
of a specific expectancy following the acquirement or fail­
ure to acquire any reinforcement diminishes as the subject 
has more experience in the situation. The 0 or 1 represents 
the acquirement or non-acquirement, respectively, of a 
given single reinforcement. The E is the expectancy level 
prior to the reinforcement. The N is some function of the 
frequency or number of previous experiences in the situa­
tion (46, p.176-177). Castaneda (6) has empirically derived 
a modification of this formula which presumably corrects 
for the presence of generalized expectancy with his subjects 
and tasks.
The learning theorists. Tolman (51), Krech (32), 
Postman (40), and recently MacCorquodale and Meehl (39), 
have utilized the concept of expectancy toward a general 
theory of learning. The approaches of these people differ 
from Rotter*s approach in a number of ways. First of all, 
they have omitted reinforcement as a construct when using 
expectancy. This omission is the major basis of the con­
troversy between them and Hull, a reinforcement theorist 
who omits expectancy. Second, Rotter*s theory differs from
15
the Tolman-Kreeh expectancy theory in that the latter 
theory views expectancy from a cognitive rather than a 
field point of view. The third point, following closely 
from the second one, is that the Tolman-Krech expectancy is 
a discontinuity type of construct. That is, either a per­
son has a "hypothesis” or expectancy about something or he 
does not. Since the increment of change is always unity, 
the concept must be quantified as either 0 or 1. There is 
no concept of degree of confidence or belief. Rotter1s E, 
on the other hand, is a continuity rather than discontinuity 
type of construct. As noted in Formula 3, an increase in E 
with increase in reinforcement or success is a monotonic 
decelerating function which may be stated in terms of 
numerical values between 0 and 1. In this sense Rotter’s 
E might be compared more closely to Hull’s habit strength 
construct, sHr, than to Tolman and Krech’s expectancy. A 
brief review discussing these various approaches can be 
found in the article by Rotter, Fitzgerald, and Joyce (47).
Relationship between expectancy and objective probabil­
ity. Brunswick has made the statement that "one of the 
comparatively neglected tasks of molar environmental psychol­
ogy is to find out the extent to which environmental heir- 
archies of probabilities...do find a counterpart in similar 
heirarchies of evaluation by the organism." (3, p.191) This 
comment, made over five years ago, seems to hold true yet 
today, since little precise work has been done in this very
16
accessible area of research. What work has been done would 
be worth mentioning here.
In 194# Preston and Baratta (41) reported a study which 
lent some evidence to the relationship of objective probabil­
ity and subjective probability. In this study subjects were 
required to bid competitively for the privilege of taking a 
bet at different probability levels. The bids were made with 
play money. The data consisted of the recording of the 
winning bids. In analysing the data, the winning bid was 
considered equal in value to the bet which was bidded for.
It was also assumed that the reinforcement values (utilities) 
of the bets were identical to the face values of the play 
money. Furthermore, it was assumed that all the p.layers had 
the same subjective probabilities as the one who won the bid.
The results were interpreted in terms of the relation 
between subjective probability and objective probability. 
According to the subjective probability scale, which was 
constructed from the results, the subjects were found to 
overestimate low probabilities and underestimate high prob­
abilities. The subjective probability curve was found to 
cross the objective probability curve at about 0.2. This 
would mean that in their study an expectancy of 20$ was 
equated with an objective probability of 20$.
The assumptions in this study are precarious. It was 
assumed that the winning bid was equal in value to the bet.
At best, this would be true only for the winning individual,
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not for the whole group. Since the bidding took place in a 
group situation, both the factors of competition and confor­
mity could have operated to mask out the results of the ex­
perimental variable. Second, the RV of the bets was assumed 
to equal the face value of the play money. The principle of 
marginal utility alone would contraindicate the use of this 
assumption. Third, the winning bid was assumed to reflect 
the probabilities of all the bidders. It would be more re­
alistic to assume that the probabilities of only the extreme 
bidders were reflected. Fourth, individual differences in 
guardedness and eagerness to bet were uncontrolled. Thus, 
an extraneous influence crould have affected the experimental 
variable. Fifth, the variability of RV was allowed rather 
than controlled. According to Crandall's studies (11,12) 
it is mandatory to control this variable to get an accurate 
measure of expectancy.
It is not to be denied, however, that the Preston-Bar- 
atta experiment itself has some generality. They obtained 
similar results from both naive students and from profes­
sors who had some acquaintance with probability theory.
Also, other studies have lent some support to the conclusions 
of Preston and Baratta.
Mosteller and Nogee (3&) did a similar study on betting 
and analysed the results in terms of utility (RV) rather 
than subjective probability. The reinterpreted their
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findings in terms of subjective probability and obtained re­
sults similar to Preston and Baratta except that the indif­
ference point was not at 0.2. Their results were more con­
clusive, however, when analysed in terms of utility rather 
than subjective probability.
Griffith (23) analysed behavior in a guessing game in­
volving the frequency of use of different letters in the 
language. Attneave (1) analysed behavior in a guiessing game 
on the frequency of use of different letters in the language. 
Sprowls (49) made analysis of various lotteries. All three 
found results similar to Preston and Baratta: overestima­
tion of low probabilities, underestimation of high probabil­
ities. Of these four studies subsequent to Preston and Bar­
atta, including Mosteller and Nogee, Attneave seems to have 
controlled reinforcement value most successfully. The other 
studies, it would seem, should be interpreted as reflect­
ing preferences for E-RV combinations rather than giving 
definite inforamtion about the relation of subjective and 
objective probability.
Crandall (12) did a study recently in which subjects 
guessed whether a marked card would appear at the top of a 
shuffled deck of cards. With each series of card guesses 
the subjects were told (l) the objective probability for 
a marked card occurring, and (2) the reward or reinforcement 
value of making a correct choice. If the percentage of yes 
guesses could be interpreted as the subjective probability,
19
the result could be interpreted as showing a slight trend 
in the direction opposite from the findings by Preston and 
Baratta. That is, the subjects underestimated low probabil­
ities and overestimated high probabilities. This finding 
occurred under all conditions of reinforcement value. The 
finding was very outstanding with a portion of the subjects 
whom Crandall referred to as ’’maximizers." These subjects 
gave 100$ yes guesses for all objective probabilities over 
50$, and 100$ no guesses for all subjective probabilities 
under 50$.
Rotter suggests that this trend, referred to as ’’maximi­
zation" by Crandall could be explained on the basis of GE. 
That is, experience generalized from other situations has 
taught the subject that maximization is a proper strategy 
to use in the situation.
Assuming this to be true, the writer suggests that the 
"maximization," or effects of GE, might not have been so 
great had the information about objective probabilities been 
conveyed to the subject through experience rather than ver­
balization. In other words, learning thedif ferential prob­
abilities through a series of training trials might have 
brought different results than the procedure of telling the 
subjects the numerical probabilities. The reason for this 
suggestion is that the verbalized probability might have 
been responded to by the subject as a cue that the situation 
was a problem-solving one —  that a "gimmick" was to be
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found. If verbalizing numerical probability truly had this 
effect, then one might expect a number of subjects to "maxi­
mize" in a problem-solving attempt. To summarize, the writ­
er feels that the ogive nature of the curve between expect­
ancy and objective probability may be due to a situational 
variable: The subject reacts to verbalized probability
numbers as if he were in a problem solving situation. He 
then draws upon his past experience and minimizes his maxi­
mum loss.
Ward Edwards (17) did a study in which subjects made 
paired comparisons among different bets all having a constant 
expected value but each having different probabilities and 
money values. (Note: this condition will be true in the dis­
sertation problem reported here.) The results indicated that 
there were preferences for certain bets and avoidance of other 
bets. Especially preferable under positive expected value was 
4/d, and especially unpreferable was 6/d. Edwards interpre­
ted the results to mean that there were preferences for 
certain probabilities. The implication from this study is 
that the relation between objective and subjective probabil­
ity is a non-linear one. Again, in this study, it seems more 
cautious to attribute the results to preferences for E-RV 
combinations rather than to preferences for probabilities.
In other words, the two variables, E and RV, were being 
varied. Edwards interpreted the results only in terms of
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the one variable, E. An interpretation in terms of both 
variables, therefore, might have been the more cautious al­
ternative.
If, on the other hand, one speculated that the results 
were actually due to the E variable alone, the preferences 
might be explained in terms of cultural familiarity. The 
A/S or 50-50 type of bet was preferred, and this is by far 
the most common bet occuring in this culture. One would 
presume that the bets occuring between .51 and .99 proba­
bility are relatively infrequently made. One would then 
expect a lack of familiarity with Edwards’ 6/S type of bet. 
Since Edwards’ subjects were college students, it might be 
suggested that they were aware of and influenced by these 
cultural frequencies.
Although the results in the above mentioned studies on 
expectancy and objective probability show reliable results 
within the framework of the design, the interpretation of the 
results were pointed out as questionable in many ways. Also, 
it appeared that different experimental designs gave rise 
to different experimental results. For example, Crandall’s 
study measuring percentage of yes guesses brought results 
opposite from the betting paradigms, such as the one by 
Preston and Baratta. Consequently, the nature of the rela­
tionship between subjective probability (1) and objective 
probability remains a problem for more definitive research.
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Laws of Expectancy. Before agreement has been reached 
on the relationship between objective and subjective prob­
ability, Ward Edwards (19) has introduced the question of 
whether subjective probability obeys the laws of probability. 
For example, he has asked the question, is subjective prob­
ability, like objective probability, bound by zero and unity? 
He also asks, will subjective probability obey the addition 
theorem? That is, will the expectancies for the occurrence 
and non-occurrence add up to unity? Will p +  q = 1 ?  As 
noted earlier, one piece of research (47) has already shown 
the sum of probability statements of subjects to exceed 100%.
It would seem that whether or not these principles are 
obeyed by expectancy is dependent on how the concept can be 
structured for maximum predictability rather than on the 
basis of any inherent quality in human nature. Edwards 
seems to be expressing this view when he says that we should 
direct our efforts toward weighting objective expectancy in 
such a way as to predict behavior, rather than trying to 
force expectancy measures to obey the laws of probability 
theory.
This argument for weighting objective expectancy seems 
to have even more force when we consider the following cir­
cumstance: It seems clear that subjective expectancy cannot
be assessed unless reinforcement value is controlled. In 
complex situations outside the laboratory, reinforcement is
23
not controlled. Therefore, we are driven toward the alter­
native of inferring expectancy from objective probability 
(plus weighting) in order to predict in these coraples situa­
tions.
Along with these hits of theoretical notion, some evi­
dence has been gathered in regard to the "laws of expect­
ancy." This evidence, mentioned in regard to Formula 3, 
page 14, has to do with the incremental change in expectancy. 
Castaneda (6) found that empirical results on incremental 
changes in expectancy differed from Formula 3, page 14 .
By readjusting the formula with weights he found a formula 
which could better explain the data:
A E = 1_t_E2_  (4)
cmr2-
The symbols E, N and A.E in this formula have the same mean­
ing as in Formula 3* The C represents a constant, equal to 
10 in the case of Castaneda’s data, which presumably corrects 
for expectancy generalized from other situations.
The implication in Castaneda’s findings is that expect­
ancy does not strictly obey the formula which describes 
incremental changes in objective probability. Whether any 
other variable except generalized expectancy accounts for 
the discrepancy is yet to be ascertained.
3. Reinforcement value: the operations.
Having had a brief look at the operations and theory 
regarding expectancy, let us now take a look at reinforcement
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value. Six operations are discussed in the following para­
graphs .
Statement of Choice. The simplest form of measurement 
for reinforcement value is the statement of choice between 
two objects when the expectancies in regard to the choices 
are held constant. Rotter (46, p.150) points out to the 
importance of avoiding extraneous variables in the measure­
ment situation. For example, it is very possible for a choice 
statement to be made because of the value of gaining accept­
ance or approval from the person present rather than from 
the actual values of the objects.
A slightly more elaborate method of measuring RV is by 
paired comparisons or forced choice method. Anne R. Rock­
well (43) and others have employed this method. Rockwell 
used a forced choice technique with items describing various 
activities in an attempt to establish whether reinforcements 
could be generalized in terms of need values.
Decision Time. A somewhat indirect way of measuring 
differences in reinforcement value was developed by E. Lot- 
sof (35) • This measure was in terms of decision time. He 
found that (1) the greater the discrepency in the RV of the 
two alternatives, the shorter will be the decision time, and 
(2) the more negative or unpleasant the choices, the longer 
the decision time. Crandall’s recent findings (12), how­
ever, indicate that decision time is also related to expect­
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ancy. He found that the closer the expectancy is to .5 in a 
double alternative situation, the greater will be the dedi- 
sion time. This measure of RV is therefore questionable 
unless expectancy is controlled.
Ranking. Perhaps the most common measure of reinforce­
ment value is the ranking of objects in terms of their pre­
ferability. Schroder (43),Hunt (27), and Dunlap (14), among 
the others, employed this technique. The difficulties with 
this technique are the ones commonly associated with rank­
ing: (1) lack of assurance of equal intervals between ranks,
and (2) lack of an absolute zero.
Rating scales. Rating scales have been used by Thorn­
dike (50) and Cartwright (4) in an attempt to get results 
more refined than those in ranking.
Ranks scaled for normality. A more advanced technique 
involves the scaling of the ranks according to the assumpt­
ion of a normal distribution among the values of the objects 
being ranked. This technique was first proposed by Hull (26) 
and was later described by Guilford (24). J. Worell (54) 
employed the technique in measuring RV. The technique as­
sumes that the items or objects to be ranked fall into a 
normal distribution, as in Figure I. Thus, the sealing of 
the ranks involves reading off the figure assigned to the 
baseline of the normal distribution. If the assumption of 
normality in regard to the dimension being examined is ac­
curate, then this technique solves the problem of getting
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a ranked 
object
Fig. 1. Graphic sketch of relation of ranked objects to 
normal distribution scaling.
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equal intervals. However, the assumption of an absolute 
zero has not yet been met. Since the normal distribution 
is bilaterally asymtotic, no absolute zero can be posted 
on the baseline. Thus, a scores, T scores, or any arbitr­
ary set of numbers (e.g., 1-10) can be posted on the base­
line. Any zero figure would be arbitrary rather than abso­
lute.
Although the use of this technique is obviously an ad­
vancement over regular ranking, its use in the measurement 
of reinforcement value might be questioned. First, the lack 
of an absolute zero might cause a problem unless there were 
a standard range of numbers, agreed upon by researchers, to 
be set on the baseline for the scaling of reinforcement 
value (e.g., 0 through 1 or 0 through 10). This arbitrary 
scale might necessarily be gauged so the median rank was always 
equated with the same given number on the scale (e.g., .5 or 5)* 
With this standardized treatment, the RV measure could be 
weighted so that its weighted value could be used in com­
bination with E in predicting BP. It should be understood 
that the particular weighting given RV is in no way absolute, 
since the numbers in the scaling are in no way absolute.
The relative weight would be meaningful and predictive only 
under the standardized conditions of scaling.
Second, this technique provokes a comment, which ap­
plies to all other techniques for the measure of RV. This
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comment is that there is a lack of empirical evidence as 
to which technique is most useful in predicting behavior.
For example, the technique developed by Hull would yield 1,
3> 3, 13, 15 as the evenly scaled ranks of a sample of 15 
objects. No research has been done to show whether this 
approach is any more reliable or predictive than using 
2, 5, 3, 11, and 14, which assumes linearity in the rankings.
The ordered metric. Having discussed the normality 
scaling technique, let us consider now another technique in 
measuring RV which may have greater possibilities. This 
one has been recently developed by Coombs (3) and is an­
other attempt to scale ranks. Various elaborations of this 
technique have been referred to as the method of triads, 
method of cartwheels, method of similarities, method of 
propellers, and the unfolding technique. In brief, the 
method involves a ranking of the various items along a 
psychological dimension and then a subsequent ranking of 
the distances between many pairs of items. The final re­
sult is what Coombs calls an ordered metric.
In the first step in the method the stimulus objects 
are presented to the individual in triads (sets of three).
The individual is asked which two objects are most alike 
and which two are least alike. In measuring reinforcement 
value in particular, the individual is asked which two 
are hardest to choose between and which two are easiest 
to choose between. All possible combinations of triads
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from the total group of objects are judged in this way.
For example, if there are five objects to be judged, these 
five objects would make a total of 10 possible sets of 
triads. The position of the stimuli in the triad and the 
serial order of the triads are randomized in the experiment.
Analysis of data begins by decomposing the subject's 
responses to each triad into three paired comparisons and 
tabhlatihg the data with respect to each individual stimulus 
object in turn. This data is then condensed into "I scales” 
for each of the stimulus objects. An ”1 scale" for object 
A, for example, may be conceived as a ranking by the sub­
ject, as he "stands” at A, of the relative distances of 
the other stimuli from A. The I scales for the two objects 
at the extreme ends of the continum are of course the rank 
order and the reverse rank order of the stimuli along the 
dimension. The I scales for the other objects in the middle 
of the ranking may be "unfolded" to reveal the relative dis­
tances among the objects along the continum. The final 
data, consisting of a ranking plus an ordering of the rela­
tive distances between objects, is called an ordered met­
ric. From this point on, it is the experimenter's task 
to interpret the meaning of the data.
It would be interesting to see if this method of scal­
ing could surpass a simple rating of all the dimensions on 
a single rating scale with direct judgments of all the
30
relative distances (e.g., as in Thorndike (50) and Cart- 
wright (4).) It would also be interesting to assign an 
arbitrary set of numbers to an ordered metric of RV and see 
if this will predict behavior any better than a regular 
ranking. It seems that Coombs is cautious about violating 
any boundaries of mathematical purity in order to test the 
degree of predictability of his scaling technique.
4. Reinforcement value: the theory and findings.
The review of the six operations for reinforcement 
value leads us now to find out what people have said and 
done about the concept.
Hedonism. Perhaps one of the first approaches to the 
area which social learning theory handles with reinforcement 
value was hedonism. In this theory, preference and avoid­
ance behavior were explained on the basis of pleasure and 
pain. Hedonism fell into disrepute because of the unrecon- 
cilable circularity in the meaning pleasure: a person
does something because it is pleasurable; it is pleasurable 
because he does it. This circularity arising from lack of 
operations forbids that pleasure be a predictive and useful 
construct.
Early utilitarianism. The hedonistic point of view 
was accepted by the early economists (Jeremy Bentham,
James Mill), who defined utilities as the pleasure- or 
pain-getting properties of objects. Their greatest
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contribution was in regard to the principle of marginal 
utility. Marginal utility proposes that the utility of 
any good is a monotonically increasing negatively accelerat­
ed function of the amount of that good. Thus, the margin by 
which the value held for a commodity falls below the linear 
money value becomes greater with the increase in amount of 
the commodity. For this reason*; according to the theory, 
prices would not be linear on commodities. A unit of a com­
modity may be ten cents, but ten units of the commodity will 
likely fall below a dollar.
In moving beyond the concept of marginal utility the 
economists began to have trouble. They were unsuccessful 
in their attempts to metricize utility and combine utili­
ties by addition to get total utility. On conceptualizing 
this problem it was recognized that ordinal utility, i.e., 
the ranking of objects in terms of utility, could be at­
tained. What was needed, however, was cardinal utility, 
a metricized measurement of utility, which could be treated 
mathematically.
Later economic theory. The many attempts to establish 
cardinal utility finally ended in a behavioristic revolt 
when Edgeworth (15) proposed to handle the problem with 
indifference curves and to forget the concepts of cardinal 
and marginal utility.
An indifference curve, proposed by Edgeworth, portrays
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graphically the different combinations of amounts of two 
commodities which evoke a lack of decision or choice on 
the part of the subject. For example, a subject may be 
indifferent to choosing 10 apples and 1 banana over 6 
apples and 4 bananas, or vice versa. Or, to use money as 
one commodity, a subject may be indifferent to choosing 10 
apples and 5 cents over 12 apples and no cents, or vice 
versa. (Indifference may be interpreted in psychophysical 
terms as the choice of one set of objects over the other 
exactly 5G$ of the time.)
A family of these indifference curves is referred to 
as an indifference map. The curves of an indifference map 
are generally convex to the origin of the axes.
The application of this type of approach to the con­
cept of reinforcement value in social learning theory remains 
undeveloped. It might be possible to quantify EV for a 
given object or series of objects by building an indifferencee 
map between the object and money or between the object and 
water under a given number of hours water deprivation.
This approach, of course, could still not assume interper­
sonal comparability or account for the situational variables.
Returning to the work done by the economists, Edwards 
(19) points out that, in spite of the concept of indiffer­
ence curves, there was some nostalgia for cardinal utility. 
This nostalgia increased greatly when economists approached.
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the problem of risky (rather than riskless) choices.
In theorizing about risky choices, the initial notion, 
advanced by mathematicians, was that people made choices 
on the basis of maximizing expected value. That is, people 
made choices on the basis of the largest possible product 
of expectancy or reward times the monetary value of the re­
ward. This notion was blasted by the fact that people sub­
scribe to insurance and like to gamble under conditions 
where the expected value is negative! Thus, the notion of 
expected utility was ushered into the place of expected 
value. Since 1944, when risky decision making became a 
focus of more attention, the problem of metricizing utility 
in order to test the notion of expected utility has been a 
stumbling block for economists, mathematicians, and 
psychologists.*
Social learning theory and reinforcement value. The 
social learning circle has been one of the groups who has 
faced this problem of metricizing and in other ways handling 
this concept of degrees of preference. This groups uses the 
label, reinforcement value, instead of utility. The extent
A number of other theorists have dealt directly with con­
cepts similar to utility, which Rotter calls reinforcement 
value. These include Lewin, Coombs, and von Neumann.Since 
they integrate the concept of reinforcement value with an 
expectancy concept, the discussion of their theories will 
be put off until the next section.
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to which metricizing has taken place has been discussed in 
the previous section on operations for RV.
Although no ironclad solutions have yet been reached 
about scaling reinforcement value, social learning theory 
has made some contributions toward understanding the compon­
ents of RV. This contribution might be described with the 
following formula:
R .v.a,sl« f (Er & R.V., , ) (5)
*  a r (b-n),Sl <b'n)’Sl
This may be read: the value of reinforcement a
in situation 1 is a function of the expectancies 
that this reinforcement will lead to other rein­
forcements b to n in situation 1 and the values 
of these otKer reinforcements b""to n in situation
1. (46, p.152)
The contribution implicit in this formula is that objects 
may have value merely because they represent subgoals or 
steps toward later goals.* Thus, the implication that 
people react solely on the basis of immediate rewards and 
rebukes is ruled out.
Social values. An obvious question in a discussion 
of theory related to reinforcement value is whether the 
sociological concept of value has any reDatability or con­
tribution to the concept discussed in this section. The 
concept of value has had a multitude of different treat­
ments in sociology and social psychology. Kluckhohn (31)
This notion has been discussed less formally by Lewin.
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attempts to strike a common denominator among these ap­
proaches by defining value in the following way:
Value implies a code or standard which has some 
persistence through time, or...which organizes 
a system of action. Value...places things, acts, 
ways of behaving, goals of action on the approval- 
disapproval continuum. Furthermore, following 
Dewey, *the desirable* is to be contrasted with 
•the desired.* (81, 395).
When talking about the operations for value,
Kluckhohn says:
When two or more pathways are equally open, and an 
individual or a group shows a consistent direction­
ality in its selections, we are surely in the realm 
of values, provided that this directionality can be 
shown to be involved in the approval-disapproval 
continuum. (31, p.405*5 (Italics mine).
Here we have a fairly clear discrimination between RV 
and social values. In the first definition, the RV concept 
would be more related to the "desired" rather than the 
"desirable." The second definition fits RV closely except 
for the provision of approval-disapproval. Approval-dis­
approval is used here in the sense of social acceptability. 
It can be fairly concluded from these definitions and the 
unquoted elaborations that social value is not another syn­
onym for what we have been talking about. Therefore, social 
value theory need not be discussed here as having direct 
bearing on our topic.
5. Expectancy and reinforcement value combined: theory 
and findings.
Now that we have examined individually the concepts 
of expectancy and reinforcement value in terms of their
theory and operations, we can now examine the various ap­
proaches in combining the two constructs.
Ramsey1s approach. Frank Ramsey (42) could perhaps 
be called the pioneer in integrating expectancy and value 
into a single theory. A mathematician-philosopher with 
some acquaintance with the early utilitarian theory, Ram­
sey introduced the idea of degrees of belief, a construct 
similar to the modern expectancy construct. Ramsey used the 
following formula to describe the relationship he proposed:
P s 1 - f(d) (6)
r - w
This formula may be read as follows: the degree of be­
lief in proposition £ is equal unity minus the amount of 
work the subject is willing to expend for complete confi­
dence divided by the advantage (RV) of the correct choice 
(success) minus the advantage (RV negative) of the in­
correct choice (failure).
Lewin*s approach. A more recent approach in integ­
rating expectancy and value has been the one by Lewin,
Dembo, Festinger, and Sears (34)• Their purpose was to 
predict the level of aspiration of individuals. By level 
of aspiration these investigators are referring to the 
level of difficulty which has the highest valence or which 
is most likely to be chosen by the given individual. The 
investigators propose that the resultant valence of any
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level of difficulty id equal the valence of succes times 
the subjective probability of success minus the valence 
of failure times the subjective probability of failure.
The formula, translated into social learning terms, might 
be as follows:
LOA = f (RV+ x E +') - (RV- x E-* (7)
Thus, the level of aspiration chosen by the individual 
will be the level of difficulty with the highest posi­
tive value from the formula.
The social learning approach. This brings us chronol­
ogically to the theory of central interest in this dis­
sertation. Unlike the previous two approaches social 
learning theory attempts to build a framework of personal­
ity constructs on the basis of the concepts of expect­
ancy and reinforcement. In approaching personality pre­
diction Rotter conceives of the individual as having a 
repertory of behaviors. Any one of these behaviors could 
potentially take place in each situation in order to ac­
quire the desired reinforcements. That behavior which is 
actually acted out is defined by Rotter as the behavior 
with the highest behavior potential. This behavior poten­
tial, a mathematical concept, is a function of the mathe­
matical value of the expectancy and reinforcement value 
and also the particular situation in which the behavior 
takes place. This function is described in Chapter I in
3d
Formula 1•
Generalizing from the BP formula (Formula 1, p. 2), 
Rotter proposes a need level of description of behavior.
In this level of description, need potential is a function 
of freedom of movement and need value (46, p.110). This 
generalized formula involves the assumption that behaviors 
are functionally interrelated by virtue of leading to 
functionally related reinforcements. The term need is 
used to refer to these functional interrelationships.
Theory of games. Another approach, somewhat differ­
ent from that of Rotter, has been the one by von Neumann 
and Morgenstern (52). This approach has been entitled the 
theory of games. The purpose of this theory is to analyse 
problems of strategic choices. These choices, of course, 
may range from simple game situations to everyday living. 
Von Neumann and Morgenstern have made a new attack on 
cardinal utility and have published an appendix on car­
dinal utility measurement in the second edition of their 
book (53)• Although the theory is too elaborate and too 
complex to be covered in this review, perhaps it would be 
important to make note of one of the central principles 
in the theory which might have relevance to social learn­
ing theory. This principle is referred to as minimax 
loss. This is a rule which is
sharply different from the rule of maximizing 
utility or expected utility...This rule is the 
rule of minimizing the maximum loss, or, more 
briefly, minimax loss. In other words, the rule 
is to consider, for each possible strategy which 
you could adopt, what the worst possible outcome 
ilV and then select that strategy which would 
have the least ill-effects if the worst possible 
outcome happened. Another way of putting the same 
idea is to call it the principle of maximizing the 
minimum gain, or maxim&n gain. (19)
Von Neumann gives us a different approach by which 
to integrate expectancy with reinforcement value. Rather 
than describing behavior on the basis of the maximum ex­
pectancy and maximum reinforcement value in case of suc­
cess, behavior is described in terms of maximum expect­
ancy and the weakest possible reinforcement value in case 
of failure.
Friedman and Saveage*s application. An economic 
application of the von Neumann and Morgenstern approach 
has been the utility curve developed by Friedman and 
Savage (21) and elaborated upon experimentally and 
theoretically by Markowitz (36), Mosteller and Nogee (3&), 
and Edwards (19). The curve, shown in Figure II, is a 
doubly inflected curve to show how gains and losses in 
money are related to gains and losses in utility. It is 
generally assumed that the individual after any gain or 
loss returns to point jd on the curve. The general im­
plication from this curve is that the function of nega­
tive or positive reinforcement value is not a linear one.
Gain
op
loss
in
utiles
+
P
Gain or loss in dollars
Fig. 2. Relationship of gain or loss in money to
gain or loss in utility. (Elaborated from 
graph by Edwards (19).)
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Coombs1 approach. Another recent approach has been
the one by Coombs. This approach has been built around a
study of decision-making in individuals. Coombs and
Komorita (10), in reflecting on the studies by Preston
and Baratta (41), Mosteller and Nogee (33), and Edwards
(17), agree with the observation that
people do not always maximize a mathematical or 
objective expected value. There are a number of 
ways to interpret this deviation from what is 
commonly called rational behavior. For Preston 
and Baratta the interpretation was deviations of 
psychological probabilities from expected proba­
bilities; for Mosteller and Nogee it was the dis­
crepancy between utility of money and the objective 
value of money; and for Edwards it was preferences 
for probabilities.
On the basis of the theory reported in the articles by 
Coombs and Komorita (10) and Coombs and Beardslee (9), an 
approach has been proposed in order to reconcile the dis­
crepancies in the interpretations. The proposal was to 
measure utility for money and subjective probability in­
dependently of each other and then test whether the in­
dividual maximizes the subjective expected value. So far, 
the measurement of utility of money has been the only re­
search project completed in the direction of this general 
plan.
The mathematical theory of Coombs proposes this sort 
of relationship: expected utility is a function of the
expectancy of success times the utility of the prize (am­
ount which could be won) minus the expectancy of failure
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times the utility of the stake (amount which could be 
lost) plus a function of risk and the individuals 
willingness to gamble. In social learning terms the 
formula would look something like this:
BP = E+X x RV+V - ((1-E+)Z x RV-w )+f (r, g) (8)
In this formula, the exponents w, x, £, and z are 
weights for the E and RV functions. E+ is the expect­
ancy for success. (1-E-V-) is the expectancy for failure. 
This function assumes that the expectancies for success 
and failure add up to 1.00. RV+ is the value of success. 
RV- is the value of failure, f (r. g) is a function of 
risk and the individual's willingness to gamble.
In his experimental investigations Coombs has ap­
plied his theory by making an ordered metric for measur­
ing the utility of money. This experiment is explained 
in some detail in the next section (cf., p.51 ). Coombs 
and his students have yet to combine measurements of 
both utility and subjective probability to predict be­
havior.
Bross* approach. A statistician named Bross (2) 
has recently written a book which conceptualizes the human 
organism as a decision maker. In simple, communicable 
language Bross expounds on his ideas about how the in­
dividual, through his decision making, developed 
specialties and a civilization. This civilization pro-
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gressed through the stages of the devil theory, the age 
of reason, and finally to the age of science. Viewing 
the organism in terms of statistical decision is a 
modification of the scientific method characteristic of 
the age of science. From the Bross point of view we may 
view the human being as a decision making machine com­
posed of three basic components: (1) a prediction system
dealing with alternative futures, (2) a value system deal­
ing with conflicting purposes, and (3) a criterion com­
ponent which integrates the prediction and value systems 
and selects the appropriate action. It is notable here 
that the prediction and value components relate somewhat 
to the concepts of expectancy and reinforcement value. 
Also, the prediction system concept relates loosely to 
George A. Kelly*s personal construct point of view. (30)
The prediction system has the job of quantifying 
the degrees of uncertainty in events. The two character­
istics which are necessary in a prediction system are 
validity and sharpness.
The study of value systems is as yet undeveloped 
according to Bross. Commerce and industry have studied 
values in terms of dollars and cents. The concept of 
utility is another possible approach.
The criterion component has been thought of in 
terms of two rules for action. One is the maximization
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of the expected gain. The other is the minimization 
of the expected loss.
The implications of this approach for social learn­
ing theory are not great. The approach by Bross is more 
literary than systematic. Perhaps his greatest con­
tribution is his flexibility in being able to apply these 
concepts to social science, anthropology, and a wide 
variety of other areas of human life.
A theoretical issue: what to do with RV. What are
the implications of these various expectancy-reinfore- 
ment value approaches for social learning theory? The 
outstanding implication from some of the approaches is 
that RV for success, or RV+, should be a separate con­
cept from the RV for failure (RV-)• This is referred to 
here as a theoretical issue, since no experimental at© 
tack has been made in direct reference to the problem.
To get a clear idea of the issue, let us first turn 
to an example. Two students have very high needs to get 
an A in a course. For both students the RV for getting 
an A is judged to be equally high. However, the negative 
RV for failing to get an A is much greater for one student 
than it is for the other. Should this situation be assumed 
possible and meaningful? Or should it be assumed that the 
RV for success always has the same absolute magnitude for 
as the RV for failure? In other words, should RV-*' and
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RV- be treated as different and independent concepts? Or, 
is one reinforcement value concept sufficient in terms 
of a criterion of predictive adequacy?
Let us now look at some of the points of view in re­
gard to this topic. Ramsey (42) chooses to divide the 
value concept and call one part the advantage of making 
the correct choice (r), and the other part, the advan­
tage of making the wrong choice (w). Lewin (34) also 
divides the construct and refers to the expectancy and 
value for success separately for the expectancy and value 
for failure. The separation of reinforcement value is 
also made implicitly in von Neumann’s theory of games.
($2) The principle of minimizing the maximum loss in­
volves the RV for failure; whereas, the usual principle 
of maximizing the expected value refers to the expectancy 
and value for success. The Friedman-Savage findings (Fig­
ure 4) indicates that the curve for loss is not identical 
nor is it ?a*i mirror image of the curve for gain. Thus, 
an experimental a rgument is made to separate the value 
concept. In Coombs' theory (9) the expectancy for failure 
is considered to be one minus the expectancy for success. 
The value for positive outcome, however, is treated in­
dependently of the value for negative outcome. In the 
Ward Edwards (17) study on probability preferences in
gambling, the curves for positive and zero expected value
are similar. However, the curve for negative expected 
value (involving negative reinforcement value) is mark­
edly different from the other two curves. Thus, these 
experimental findings present another argument for treat­
ing the concepts separately.
If we were to assume that behavior prediction would 
be increased by using RV-V- separate from RV-, it would 
seem that the clinical implications would be notable. It 
would seem that RV- would have much more relevance to 
the area of avoidance and maladjustive behavior than would 
RV-V. The suggestion might be made that maladjustment would 
derive not necessarily from punishment, per se, but from 
(1) the inability to expect or predict a consequence when 
behaving in a given way (E-), and (2) the value of the 
failure when failing to reach the expected outcome or 
consequences (RV-). Such an approach to maladjustment, 
if it is a fruitful one, would be facilitated by two RV 
concepts rather than one.
6. Expectancy and reinforcement value combined: the
experimental issues.
Having covered the various theoretical approaches 
and the outstanding theoretical issue in regard to RV 
concepts, we can now turn our heads toward some of the 
general experimentation done in the field. The word 
general is used in contrast to the word applied. Research
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aimed toward relating E and RV to personality variables 
will not be dealt with here.
Two main issues stand out in the recent experimental 
studies. One issue is whether E is independent of RV. The 
other issue is to what extent E and RV can be mathematically 
combined to predict BP. The research relevant to each prob­
lem will be discussed briefly.
Independence of E and RV. Are the concepts E and RV 
independent of each other? Rotter's point of view is that 
there is no necessary relationship between E and RV. How­
ever, in certain situations a direct relationship may exist 
and in other situations an inverse relationship may exist.
Marks (37) did a card-guessing experiment with child­
ren in which stated expectations were influenced by rein­
forcement value. She found that desirable events were 
anticipated more frequently than undesirable ones when the 
objective probabilities for each event were equal.
Irwin (2d) repeated the Marks study with adults and 
found the same results.
Rotter criticizes the Marks-Irwin technique because 
no premium (high RV) was put on the accuracy of the guess­
ing:
We would question whether what was being measured 
were the real expectancies or the behavior potential 
for stating that the outcome would be favorable...
It may be asked whether the more valued reinforcements 
actually tend to increase the expectancy of their 
occurring or whether under certain conditions they
4$
may only increase the potential of the subjectsf 
stating that he thinks they will occur, partly 
because he has no need to differentiate his true 
expectancies for his wishes. (46, p.l64)
Crandall (12) repeated the Marks and Irwin studies with 
certain modifications. The principle difference was that 
he put a premium on accuracy of guesses by emphasis on the 
instructions. His results nevertheless resembled those of 
Marks and Irwin but had less magnitude. Expectancy state­
ments were raised when reinforcement values were high, es­
pecially when objective probability was equal.50.
This writer feels that the way in which the premium was 
put oh accuracy might have had some bearing on the resultant 
relation between E and RV. If a sizable monetary reward 
(in addition to the reward involved in the experimental 
variable) were given everytime a subject made a correct 
guess, this might have successfully combatted the wishful 
element in the response better than the verbal statements 
at the beginning of the experiment. Thus, the writer feels 
the reward-for-correctness condition might bring the percent­
age of yes guess close to the objective probability for 
marked card occurrences.
Worell (55) approached the problem of studying the 
influence of RV on stated expectancy in a different way.
He manipulated RV by choosing three tasks which had high, 
medium, and low reinforcement value for fifth and sixth 
graders. He studied the effects of the following three
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independent variables upon expectancy statements:
These were (1) the effect of differential RVs upon 
stated expectancies in an chievement situation,
(2) the effect of novelty and increasing experience 
upon expectancies stated to different reinforcement 
values, and finally (3) the effect of the association 
of a reinforcement value for accuracy to expectancy 
statements. (55)
Worell found that reinforcement value had an effect on 
the level of stated expectancy. Unlike the results of Marks, 
Irwin, and Crandall, Worell found that the higher the RV 
of a task, the lower was the statement of expectancy. In 
discussing this finding Worell points out quite clearly and 
adequately the differences between his "achievement” situa­
tions, which reflect on the subject's competence, and the 
"non-achievement" situations, such as chance betting and 
guessing, which were used by other investigators. The im­
plication here is that an expectancy statement in answer to 
WWhat kind of performance am I going to make?" is quite 
different from the expectancy statement in answer to "What 
is my guess about the outcome of this event over which I 
have no control?" E. J. Phares is presently making a fur­
ther systematic investigation of this variable.
Worell1s second finding is that RV has maximal influence 
upon stated expectancy when the situation is novel. When 
experience increases, the influence of RV becomes negligible. 
This same finding was reached by Crandall (11) in the "chance 
guessing" situation. That is, with increased experience
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Worell’s expectancy statements for high RV tasks came U£ to 
the level of expectancy statements for low RV tasks. In 
Crandall’s experiment, increased experience brought expect­
ancy statements for high RV activities down to the level of 
expectancy statements for low RV activities. Worell explains 
this effect of experience in terms of decreasing effect of 
generalized expectancy.
Worell’s third finding was that a raised RV for accur­
acy of expectancy statement leads to (1) more realistic
expectancy statements, and (2) expectancy statements which 
are relatively less affected by previous experience. This 
finding is in partial support of the writer’s feeling that
not enough RV was put on accuracy of expectancy statement
in the previous Crandall study to make any difference.
Relationship of E and RV in predicting BP. The second 
major experimental issue in the E-RV theories is how E and RV 
can be combined for maximal prediction of BP.
Coombs has set himself to this projedt by formulating 
the mathematical theory described in the previous section.
A general statement of his purpose is as follows:
Another possible approach to these problems /“other 
than interpreting results only in terms of E jorl 
RV alone7... is to measure (at the level of an 
ordered metric) utility for money and subjective 
probability independently of each other and then 
go into the product space of the two variables to 
test whether the individual maximizes a subjective 
expected value. (10, p.3)
51
At this point Coombs has accomplished only the first 
step in this task. He has published a study with Komorita 
on measuring utility of money through decision making. The 
purpose of the study was to obtain metric relations from 
three sets of bets to test the additivity condition on the 
fourth or test series. Throughout the experiment the 
probability of winning or losing was .50. In the first 
three series of bets the expected values (ExRV) were 0,
.60, and .90, respectively. In the test series the expected 
value was .30. Three subjects were presented with triads 
of bets within each of the given series and by analysis 
ordered metrics of the RVs of the bets were obtained for 
each subject. These metric relations were used to predict 
the responses in the fourth series. Thirty predictions were 
made and 29 of them were confirmed. These results point 
favorably to the value of the ordered metric approach in 
scaling RV.
J. Worell (54) has made a more advanced investigation 
in combining E and RV. Her approach differed in two major 
respects from the research on betting: (1) expectancy was
induced through controlled experience on the task, and (2)
RV consisted not of money but was represented by objects 
which were scaled numerically by the experimenter for nor­
mality. It was felt that these two conditions would render 
the experimental situation more representative of typical
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life situations where choice behavior occurs.
In her experiment children aimed a steel ball down a 
three-foot blind runway toward pegs which they could not 
see. False or controlled "information" about their per­
formance was given by red and green lights which were ob­
viously wired to the pegs. (The pegs were visible to the 
subjects only during a demonstration before the experiment.) 
In essence, the experimenter manipulated the lights to 
control the "performance" which each individual thought he 
was making. The task was varied by using one, three, and 
five pegs in the back of the box. Expectancy was defined 
in terms of the objective probability of positive reinforce­
ments. Fewer pegs were used when lower expectancy patterns 
were used, and vice versa. The reinforcements were small 
plastic charms. These charms, divided into 15 boxes ac­
cording to their types, were reliably ranked by the subjects. 
The normal curve scaling procedure was then used to arrive 
at a measure of reinforcement value.
The one hundred thirty subjects, divided into three 
groups, were each given three different conditions which 
might be described in terms of the E-RV combinations (e.g.,
E « .16 and RV = .90, E * .63 and RV = .50, etc.). After 
a series of trials under each condition, the subjects were 
then allowed to choose the condition they liked best for 
another trial. Worell was then able to rank the behavioral
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preferences throughout all three groups because of over­
lapping E-RV conditions from group to group. This ranking 
made it apparent that RV, as she had defined it, had more 
relationship to the behavioral preferences than E. By 
cubing RV she was able to arrive at an E-RV product which 
had a rank-difference correlation of .99 with behavior choice. 
She then concluded that the best fit formula was as follows:
BP = E (KRV)3 (9)
where K is equal a constant to correct for relativity of RV. 
She was cautious, however, about stating whether this for­
mula generalized beyond her data.
The lack of an absolute zero in the normality scaling 
has already been pointed out by the writer. A criticism 
of the Worell study can be made, which follows from this 
absence of an absolute measure for RV. One way of stating 
this criticism is to say that the Worell study was vulner­
able to error due to uncontrolled range of the RVs sampled. 
Let us suppose that the range of RV is extremely wide. The 
charm ranked first would be extremely more valuable than 
the charm ranked last. In such case the charms ranked first 
or very high would be tried for even with a low expectancy 
of attainment. The charms ranked low in value with a 100$ 
or near 100$ expectancy of attainment would be ignored. In 
such a case RV would be the ruling variable. On the other 
hand, let us suppose the range of RV were narrow. The charms 
would be nearly equal in choice value. The subject would
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then respond more in terms of expectancy level than RV 
level. The upshot of this criticism is that Worell may 
have by chance sampled a group of charms with a very wide 
range of RVs, therefore causing the RV component of the for­
mula to be more dominant.
Another experiment on the relation between E and RV in 
predicting behavior is Edwards* experiment (17)• This was 
an investigation of betting behavior. A pinball machine 
was rigged to control the movement of a ball into any one 
of the other of eight final positions. Three series of 
bets were set up concerning the movement of the ball. One 
series of bets had a positive expected value (ExRV=$.53 
won). This means that by chance alone the subject would 
gain money during the betting. Another series had a nega­
tive expected value (ExRV=$.53 lost). That is, the sub­
ject would stand to lose money in the long run. The third 
series had a zero expected value (ExRV=0). In other words, 
the subject was apt to break even. Bets were presented in 
paired comparisons within each series and the subjects 
chose the bet they preferred in regard to each pinball shot.
Among the bets with positive expected value, the bet 
of E=4/$, RV=$1.05 was the most preferred. The bet of E=6/& 
and RV=$.70 was the least preferred. The results for zero 
expected value were similar. The results for negative ex­
pected value, however, showed a clear-cut preference for 
**long shot” bets with low E (l/B) and high RV (lose $4.20)
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with a fairly straight gradient to the other extreme of 
least preferred (E=8/8, RV=#.53 lost).
Edwards interpreted the results as meaning that speci­
fic preferences exist for specific probabilities (e.g., pre­
fer 4/S, avoid 6/3). If this interpretation is accepted, the 
writer feels one might explain the preferences on the basis 
of cultural familiarity. That is, a 50-50 (4/S) bet is very 
common and a 4 to 3 (6/S) bet is not.
On the other hand, one might interpret the results in 
other ways. Since RV was not constant, one might interpret 
the results in terms of preferences for specific money 
values (prefer #1.05, avoid $.70) or in terms of prefer­
ences for E-RV combinations.
Another possible interpretation, which would represent 
a flaw in the experiment, would be that 6/S and 7/S expect­
ancy instructions were verbalized differently. The follow­
ing clauses, abstracted from the instructions, depict the 
verbalization of the probabilities:
(l/S) If you roll a 4...
(2/S) If you roll a 1 or 7..»
(3/S) If you roll a 2, 4, or 6...
(4/S) If you roll a 2, 4, 7, or S...
(5/S) If you roll a 2, 3> 5, 7> orS...
(6/8) If you roll anything but a 3 or 6...
(7/S) If you roll anything but a 5..*
(S/S) Regardless of what you roll...(17)
The change in verbalization at 6/8 may or may not have ac­
counted for the differential results.
Edwards also ran the three conditions of: (1) ’’just
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imagining,” (2) playing with worthless chips, and (3) play­
ing with real money. Since Edwards failed to counterbalance 
the order of these conditions, it is impossible to tell 
whether the differential results are due to the experimental 
variables or increased experience. If the experimental var­
iable were operating, the results would mean that real gamb­
ling, as opposed to play gambling, produces more long shots 
and risky behavior. If increased experience were operating, 
it would mean that the longer one experiences a situation, 
the less cautious one becomes. It should be noted that both 
these variables could possibly be operating at the same time. 
7. Overture for the present study.
The present study is another attempt to investigate the 
nature in which E and RV can be combined to predict behavior. 
The study utilizes different aspects from both the Worell and 
the Edwards experiments. Like the Worell study, the present 
study conveys the variable of expectancy to the subject by 
controlled experience (taking chips from drawers) rather than 
by verbalization of the numbers and probability information. 
It is assumed here, as in other studies previously noted, 
that the objective probability variable in the training will 
bring forth closely related expectancies in the individual. 
The use of money, which may be responded to in terms of its 
absolute value, is avoided. The writer agrees with Worell 
that the conditions are more similar to the majority 
of life situations than are the conditions in
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betting experiments.
Unlike Worellfs study, however, this study defines RV 
in terms of numbers of plastic chips, the money value of which 
is not known until after the experiment. This procedure 
allows two important conditions. First, it allows an abso­
lute scaling of the economic value in terms of numbers of 
chips. It is assumed here that this objective or economic 
value will have a fairly close relationship with reinforcement 
value. It is important to note here, however, that absolute 
scaling of reinforcement value has not been achieved with the 
scaling of economic value. It is also to be noted that mar­
ginal utility is assumed not to be a disturbing influence 
at this level. This would be a tenuous assumption when RV 
is at higher values. Second, the procedure allows a con­
stant expected value as in the Edwards study. A basis is 
given, then, for evaluating the relative weight of each of 
the variables, E and RV, in predicting BP. As can be seen 
in the table below, the expected value in the present ex­
periment for the low RV level is one chip (E x low RV). The 
expected value for the high RV level is three chips (E x 
high RV). This is true under each of the five E-RV combina­
tions which each subject experiences:
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E RV1 (low RV) RV2 (high RV)
1/3 3 chips 24 chips
2/3 4 chips 12 chips
4/3 2 chips 6 chips
6/3 11/3 chips 4 chips
(average)
3/3 1 chip 3 chips
The subjects in the study underwent either the high RV or 
the low RV or both conditions mentioned above. In going 
through each of these conditions, the experience of the 
subject was controlled by the experimenter. After each of 
these training conditions the subjects were allowed to choose 
the drawers (E-RV;combinations) which they thought would 
bring them the most chips possible. Each chip was known 
to be transferable into money, the amount of which was un­
specified. It is to be noted here that the situational 
variable of chance was not well defined in this study. In­
dividual differences among the subjects may have existed 
as a function of whether they saw the situation as one of 
chance or one which called upon their own resources to figure 
out the "correct drawer.”
Following from the social learning formulation in 
Formula 1, the naive prediction was made that the subjects 
would prefer all of the E-RV combinations equally. The 
purpose of the experiment was to see how subjects would
deviate from this mathematical model under conditions of 
the four experimental variables. This brings us to the
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formal statement of the four hypotheses of the study.
3. The hypotheses.
Hypothesis I. Sex differences have no effect on choice 
behavior involving varying expectancy-reinforcement value 
combinations.
Hypothesis II. Age differences have no effect on choice 
behavior involving varying expectancy-reinforcement value 
combinations.
Hypothesis III. Changes in the relative magnitude of 
reinforcement value have no effect on choice behavior in­
volving varying expectancy-reinforcement value combinations.
Hypothesis IV. Increased experience has no effect on 
choice behavior involving varying expectancy-reinforcement 
value combinations.
Ill
METHODOLOGY
1. Apparatus.
Drawer-shield apparatus. The major piece of apparatus 
consisted of a plywood shield, 2’ high and 3if wide, which 
concealed the activity of the experimenter from the subject* 
At the base of this shield and built into it were a set of 
five drawers, constructed from 3x5 card file temporary trans­
fer cases. The five drawers were numbered in order from 
left to right for purposes of identification. The drawers, 
which could be opened by the subject, were lined with black 
cloth. Visible from the experimenter^ side of the appara­
tus, square holes were cut in the tops of the five trans­
fer cases so that chips could be easily dropped into the 
drawers. Another smaller hole was cut in each of the trans­
fer cases at the very rear edge of the top side. These holes 
allowed the experimenter to see whether the drawers were 
closed completely. For a picture of the apparatus, see 
Figures 5 and 4*
Chips. Four hundred and fifty yellow plastic poker 
chips, purchased from F. & R. Lazarus, Columbus, could be 
stacked conveniently in reserve on the base of the drawer- 
shield apparatus at either side or in back of the transfer 
cases.
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Fig. 3. Subject’s view of the apparatus.
Fig. 4. Experimenter’s view of apparatus
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Slot box. A blue data file box was placed on its side 
at the right side of the drawer-shield apparatus. The front 
edge of the box was flush with the front of the shield. A 
slot was cut in the front side of the box so the subject could 
deposit into the box no more than two chips at a time. The 
bottom of the box, which now could be described as the side 
of the box nearest the experimenter, had a 5n square hole in 
it. This allowed the experimenter to retrieve the chips 
deposited into the box when his supply became low.
Money box. Another 3x5 card file temporary transfer 
case was used as a "money box” and was put in place of the 
slot box when the subject was dealing with chips of real 
money value to him. Obviously, the experimenter was unable 
to retrieve any chips from this box during the process of 
the experiments.
Pay-off placards. Placards made of light weight poster 
paper, 7” x 23”, were placed across the tops of the transfer 
cases between the two sets of holes. On these placards were 
written the number of chips to go into each drawer for eight 
consecutive training trials. The numbers were columnednin 
such a way that the correct number of chips could be stacked 
on top the written number of the placard in advance. It 
will be explained in the procedure section exactly how 
the placards were used.
Data sheet. The data sheets, which were duplicated 
by ditto machine, contained blanks for the basic information
about the subject and a protocol of his performance on the 
test trials. The random order of pay-off on the test trials 
was printed on the data sheets and each of the 16 preferences 
by the subject on the test trials were recorded with the in­
formation as to whether his choice met with success or fail­
ure. An example of a typical data sheet can be found in 
Appendix A, page
Money. A box of change was on hand to be used in ex­
changing the chips for money after the experiment. It is 
of interest here that some subject? voiced disbelief when 
they were asked to trade in their chips for money. This 
was apparently a result of (1) the feeling that the experi­
ment was a class requirement for which they should receive 
no money, and (2) their having become accustomed to taking 
part in experiments which bring them no monetary return. 
Whatever the explanation the same reaction of disbelief 
in regard to getting money has also been observed among OSU 
students in freshman psychology classes by Joyce and Phares. 
Since the performance of these disbelievers was in no way 
deviant from those subjects who made no comment, it might 
perhaps be proposed that merely being successful in getting 
chips would be sufficient reinforcement to the subjects 
without having to be rewarded with money.
2. Subjects
One hundred fifty-six subjects were used in the study.
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Twenty-five fifth grade pupils were tested at Douglas Element­
ary School in Columbus. Twenty-five eighth grade pupils were 
tested at Everett Junior High School. These two schools were 
fairly evenly matched in terms of socioeconomic status. One 
hundred six subjects were tested from the freshman psychology 
classes at Ohio State University. Serving in three hours of 
experiments was a part of the college students1 regular course 
requirements.
3. Experimental groups.
These subjects were divided into four major groups in 
order to test the experimental hypotheses. These groups are 
described in Table I in terms of the conditions which they 
underwent. To understand the difference between low RV and 
high RV conditions, it may be necessary to refer to page 5S.
In brief, the relative amount of chips was always three times 
greater in the transactions of the high RV conditions than 
in the low RV conditions. Each group and subgroup was 
split evenly between male and female*
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TABLE I
The Experimental Groups
Group
Number
Age
Level
First
Condition
Second
Condition
I Fifth Grade Low RV (N, 25) none
II Eighth Grade Low RV (N, 25) none
III College Student Low RV (N, 64) High RV (N, 24) 
Repeat Low RV 
(N,20)
IV College Student High RV (N, 42) Low RV (N, 26) 
none (n= 16)
4. Procedure
One subjects experience. The subject was placed in a 
chair facing the drawer-shield apparatus. After some basic 
information, such as name, age, instructor, etc., was re­
corded on the data sheet, the following instructions were 
read to her:
This is an experiment on choice behavior. First 
of all, during the warm up period, I want you to 
open the drawers you see before you in a random 
order. Select a drawer--just one at a time— and 
take the chips from the black cloth pocket. Put 
them in the slot in this box. Close the drawer and 
then select another drawer. Continue until you’ve 
emptied all five drawers. After you have emptied 
all the drawers, wait until I say ”go ahead.” Then 
repeat the procedure.
Always vary the order of selecting the drawers as 
if you were flipping a coin or rolling dice in order 
to see which drawer to choose.
In some drawers you will find no chips. In some 
you will find one chip. In some you will find more 
than one.
Are there any questions?
As soon as the instructions were read and the apparatus
was ready, the experimenter said, ”Go ahead.” The subject
then proceeded according to the instructions to empty all
the drawers 24 times consecutively. As soon as these 24
training trials were finished, the following instructions
were read to the subject:
In the next part of the experiment you will have 
a chance to make some money.
Now, as you have noticed, each drawer pays off a 
different percentage of the time and with a
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different amount of chips. In the next part of 
the experiment you will make.16 more drawer openings 
— one at a time instead of five at a time. This 
time each chip you get will be worth a certain 
amount of money which I will pay you at the end 
of the experiment. I won't tell you now how much 
each chip is worth, but it will be worth trying 
for. Each drawer will pay off in exactly the 
same percentage and amount as it did before. The 
object of the whole experiment is to see how well 
you can take advantage of the experience you've 
just had so that you can make the 16 openings in 
such a way as to get yourself the greatest amount 
of money possible.
You may choose one drawer all the time or you may 
choose different drawers. Remember to select the 
drawer or drawers which you think pays off the 
most. Stop after each drawer opening until I say,
"Go ahead.” This time put your chips in this box.
Are there any questions?
After this, the apparatus was again made ready. The
subject then opened the drawers she chose one at a time for
16 trials. The random order of chip pay-off for each
probability level was followed from the order or reverse
order printed on the data sheet. As soon as the 16 money
trials were finished, the subject was then asked:
At the time you finished the first part of the 
experiment— while you were using that box— which 
drawer did you think had paid off the greatest 
total number of chips. For example, if you had 
counted every chip from every drawer, which 
drawer would have paid off the most? (Subject 
then asked to rank all drawers.)
After the verbal ranking of the drawers was recorded, 
the subjects who had to undergo a second condition of the 
experiment were told they would undergo a repetition of the
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experiment with the same instructions except that the draw­
ers would pay off in a different way. The money box was 
laid aside and the slot box was returned. The training 
trials for the second condition were then started. The 
second condition always followed the same procedure as the 
first.
The subjects who did not have to undergo another condi­
tion were reimbursed for the number of chips they had col­
lected. For the subjects who underwent two conditions the 
reimbursement for both conditions came at once at the end 
of the experiment.
Generally, the subjects were reimbursed a penny for 
each chip. The one exception was with Group III subjects 
who underwent only one condition. These students were 
given three cents per chip. The amount of reimbursement 
actually made no difference in the experiment since the 
data had already been collected when the reimbursement 
was made.
The controlled training experience. The "warm-up” or 
training trials consisted of controlled experience in which 
each drawer paid off chips with a given expectancy. This 
expectancy was defined in terms of the objective probability. 
In other words, the l/3 expectancy drawer paid off chips 
once in eight openings; the 2/3 drawer paid off two times 
in eight openings, etc*
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The order in which the drawers actually paid off was 
randomized for any one given subject but was systematical­
ly alternated from subject to subject. This was done by use 
of the placards on which the chips were stacked before 
being deposited into the drawers.
The purpose of the placards was twofold: (1) to
facilitate the random payoff of chips at given probabili­
ties for each drawer, (2) to vary the drawer positions from 
subject to subject. The following example will help ex­
plain how the placards were used to control the way in which 
the chips were paid off in the training trials. Since there 
were 24 training trials and chips for eight trials on each 
placard, there were a total of three placards used for any 
one subject. The placards 1A, 2A, and 3A were as follows:
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Drawer position 5 4 3 2 1
Expectancy level 8/8 6/8 2/8 4/8 1/8
1 1 0 2 0
1 0 0 0 0
1 2 4 2 0
(Placard 1A) 1 0 0 2 0
1 1 4 0 8
1 0 0 2 0
1 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0
1 2 0 2 8
1 1 0 0 0
1 2 0 2 0
(Placard 2A) 1 1 0 2 0
1 0 0 2 0
1 2 4 0 0
1 1 0 2 0
1 1 4 0 0
1 2 0 0 0
1 2 0 0 0
1 0 0 2 0
(Placard 3A) 1 1 0 2 0
1 1 0 0 8
1 1 4 0 0
1 1 0 0 0
1 1 4 2 0
The first subject was given the above pay-off sequence, 
1A, 2A, 3A (or, more briefly, 123A). The next five subjects 
would have the order systematically changed: 132A, 213A,
231A, 312A, 321A. Then the seventh subject would have se­
quence 123B and the following five subjects would go through 
the respective B sequence. The next set of six subjects 
would go through the C sequence and the next set through the
f
71
D sequence. Then, the process was repeated beginning with 
the twenty-fifth subject.
The 5, C, and D sequences were identical to the A 
sequence except for the drawer positions being changed for 
the different expectancy levels. The manner of this change 
was as follows:
Drawer numbers: 5 If 3 2 1
Sequence A 6/6 6/6 2/6 4/a 1/6
Sequence B k/6 6/6 1/S 2/6 6/6
Sequence C 6/6 2/6 6/6 1/6 4/a
Sequence D 1/6 k/6 6/6 6/6 2/6
This sequence alternation was not a complete counter­
balancing, but an inspection of the data in regard to drawer 
preferences revealed that the variable of positional prefer­
ences was effectively controlled. (It may be of interest 
to note that during the low EV trials (zero to eight chips 
in a drawer) the second and fourth drawers were highly 
preferred. During the high RV trials (zero to 24 chips in 
a drawer) there was a preference gradient from right to 
left, the right side being the most preferred.)
Randomization of experience on the money trials. By 
drawing numbers from a box the following order of pay&off 
was devised for each of the money trials:
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a/a 6/a 4/a 2/a i/a
i 0 2 0 0
i i 0 0 0
l i 0 4 0
i 2 0 4 0
i 1 0 0 0
i 1 2 0 0
i 0 2 0 0
i 0 2 0 a
i 1 0 0 0
i 1 2 0 0
i 2 2 4 0
i 2 2 0 a
i 2 0 0 0
i 0 0 0 0
i 1 0 4 0
i 1 29 0 0
The subjects were given chips in each drawer in the 
order given above until they had finished 16 trials. Then 
the sequence stopped. Only when a subject pulled one drawer 
all sixteen times did he go through any complete column. If 
a subject repeated a condition in the experiment, she was 
then paid off in the reverse order from the way she had been 
paid before (top of list to bottom, or bottom of list to 
top). Otherwise, the order was reversed from subject to 
subject.
Controls. Extraneous variables could enter the experi­
ment in a number of different ways. The attempts to control 
these variables might be summarized in the following way.
1. Optimally, the subjects were to choose the drawer on 
the basis of the expectancy and reinforcement value variables
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rather than on the basis of extraneous auditory and visual 
cues. These extraneous cues were handled in the following 
way: Besides the plywood shield, which concealed the
activities of the experimenter, the drawer casing contained 
holes which could readily reveal whether a drawer was 
slightly open. The drawers were lined with cloth and padded 
with tissue. With the college subjects it was possible to 
have a fan near the apparatus to mask the sound from the 
chips. The inaccuracies of the subjects in capitalizing 
on any noises indicated that this variable was well con­
trolled in all the groups.
2. Another type of variable extraneous to E and RV would 
be the habits which could be built up to other sets of cues.
The drawer positions were counterbalanced for the five E-RV 
combinations to control for positional habits and prefer­
ences. The chip pay-off was randomized rather than systemat­
ic in order to prevent any learning of patterns or sequences 
of pay-off. The subjects were asked to open the five drawers d 
during the training trials in a different way each time,
so that no drawer opening habits would be built up independ­
ently of the Es and RVs.
3. Plastic chips, all of one color, were used rather 
than money. This was because of individual and socioeconomic 
differences in reaction to given face values of money. For 
the same reasons, the instructions did not reveal the exact 
amount of money each chip was worth.
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4* A slot box was used for depositing the chips so 
the subjects would not gain direct information about the 
relative amounts which each drawer was paying off. The 
slot in the box would receive only two chips at a time. 
This was planned in order to force some differential 
experience in regard to the various amounts of chips by 
having the larger amounts of chips take longer to get 
rid of.
5. The pay-off placards conveniently reduced the 
possibilities of experimenterTs error and facilitated in 
the counterbalancing of position and the randomization 
of the pay-off.
IV
RESULTS
1. The analytical approach to the data.
The raw material. Expectancy and reinforcement value 
in this study are defined, respectively, in terms of the 
probability of a drawer having chips and the amount of 
chips it had. The drawers are thus referred to as having 
E-RV combinations. These E-RV combinations represent the 
independent variables when studying any single subject.
Behavior potential is defined in terms of the drawer 
choices made by each subject after he has undergone a 
training period in which he has "learned” the expectancy 
and reinforcement value of each drawer. These drawer 
choices represent the dependent variable of the study and 
the raw materials which are to be analyzed. Each of the 
156 subjects opened 16 drawers during the final test period. 
Each time a drawer was opened, there was a total of five 
drawers to choose from.
The methods of analysis. There are several ways in 
which these drawer choices may be analyzed. One method
^Another dependent variable, the verbal ranking of the 
drawers,has not been extensively analyzed. A sample of 
verbal choices from 36 college subjects were inspected, 
and the results were very similar to the behavioral 
choices.
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is the evaluation of the mean number of choices for each 
drawer (E-RV combination) out of the total of 16 choices 
from each subject. This method has notable descriptive value 
but limited analytical value. The mean preferences always 
add to a constant of 16. The resulting zero variance for­
bids the use of analysis of variance or chi square rank.
T tests between all the possible E-RV combinations, groups, 
and conditions is possible, but this would be an uneconomical 
undertaking, What was actually done in this study was to 
compute fc tests between the two extreme means under each 
experimental group and condition.
A second approach to the data is to analyze the modal 
or most frequent drawer choice of each individual. This 
method has less descriptive value than the mean preference 
data. One does not know to what degree the modal choice 
was chosen over and above the other possible choices. The 
main advantage to this method is its analytical facility.
By chi square the differences between groups and the dif­
ference of any one group from chance can readily be analyzed.
A third method of approaching the data is to analyze 
only the first choice made by each subject after the train­
ing period. The value of this method lies in the fact that 
the first choice a person makes in the test period is the 
most virgin measure of the behavior potential which was built 
up during the training trials. After the first choice, be-
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havior will be influenced more and more by the successes 
and failures during the final test period. This might be 
described as a constant error which enters into the measure­
ment of the first two methods. As with the modal choice 
method^ chi square analysis can readily yield inferences 
in regard to the hypotheses.
More attention will be directed toward the first choice 
analysis in exposing and discussing the results. It is to 
be noted that the variable error in the first choice method 
is judged as high. The reasons for this will be elaborated 
upon in the next chapter. However, it is felt that the 
first choice method would be free of the possible constant 
error which might be affecting the mean preferences and 
modal choice methods.
2. The exposition.
Descriptive statistics. The frequencies of first choices 
for the various E-RV combinations in each of the experimental 
groups and conditions are given in Graphs I to VII. The 
summary of these frequencies, described in the graphs, may 
be found in Table II.
The mean number of choices for each drawer (E-RV com­
bination) out of the total of 16 choices for each of the 
groups and conditions is given in Graphs VII to XIV. The 
summary of all the means, described in these graphs, may be 
found in Table III.
nNumber
of
first
choices
10
E 8/8 6/8 k/B 2/8 1/8
RV 1 1 1/3 2 k 8
E-RV Combinations
Graph I. Frequencies of first choices for each E-RV com­
bination for fifth grade pupils (low RV),
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Graph II, Frequencies of first choices for each E-RV com­
bination for eighth grade pupils (low RV),
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Graph HI. Frequencies of first choices for each E-RV com­
bination among college students (low RV).
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Frequencies of first choices for each E-RV conn 
bination among college students (high RV).
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Graph V* Frequencies of first choices for each E-RV com­
bination in a second condition among college
students (deflated RV),
S3
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Graph VI* Frequencies of first choices for each E-RV com­
bination in a second condition among college
students (inflated RV)*
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initial
repeat
8?8 6^8 4/8 2/6 1/8
E-RV combinations
Frequencies of first choices of E-RV combinations 
in a first condition compared with a repetition 
of the same condition (college students, low RV)«
Group Condition Frequency of First Choices 
for each E-RV Combination.
3/3 6/3 4/3 2/3 1/3
I l:Low RV 6 7 3 3 6
II l:Low RV 3 1 10 3 3
III 1 :Low RV 13 9 3 16 16
IV l:High RV 9 5 9 5 14
III 2:High RV 5 9 7 2 3
IV 2:Low RV 7 7 5 3 2
III l:Low RV 
sample 7 2 1 6 4
2:Low RV
repeated 4 4 5 2 5
Table II. Summary of frequency of first choices for various E-RV 
combinations.
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Graph VIII* Mean number of preferences for E-RV combinations
among fifth grade students in the low RV con­
dition*
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Graph IX. Mean number of preferences for E-RV combinations 
among eighth grade pupils in the low RV condition,
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Graph X, Mean number of preferences for E-RV combinations 
among college students in the initial low RV 
condition.
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Graph XI* Mean number of preferences for E-RV combinations
among college students in the initial high RV
condition.
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Graph XU, Mean number of preferences for E-RV combinations 
in college students in the deflated RV condition 
(previous experience in the high RV condition)*
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Graph XIII. Mean number of choices for E-RV combinations
among college students in the inflated RV con­
dition (previous experience in the low RV con­
dition) .
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Graph XIV. Mean number of preferences for E-RV combinations 
among college students in the low RV condition 
as compared with the preferences of the same 
group upon repetition of the experiment.
Mean Preferences for
Graph Academic Drawer Expectancy Levels
Number Group Condition Level 6/6 6/6 4/6 2/6 l/6
I I Low RV Fifth Grade 4.64 3.36 2.60 2.56 2.64
II II Low RV Eighth Grade 3-66 4.00 2.92 2.66 2.32
III III Low RV College 3.97 3.02 2.46 3.17 3,36
IV IV High RV College 4.24 2.93 2.55 2.71 3 ^ 7
V IV Low RV College 5.63 3.06 2.63 2.33 2.13
VI III High RV College 4.31 4.73 2.69 1.54 2.73
VII III Low RV 
Repeat
College
College
3.95
4.25
3.05
2.40
2.65
2.90
3.05
2.55
3.10
3.90
Table III. Mean number of Preferences out of 16 Choices for each of 
the experimental groups and conditions * in regard to the 
various E-RV combinations.
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The summary of the frequencies of modal choices are 
given in Appendix B. These findings are not described in 
graphic form.
Analytical statistics. Chi square analyses of the 
degree to which first choices differ from chance in each 
of the experimental groups and conditions are given in 
Table IV. Essentially, these analyses are tests of the 
naive formulation that, under conditions of constant ex­
pected value, no differences will be found in the choice 
behavior with the varying E-RV combinations.
Results of chi square analyses of first choices in 
regard to the four experimental hypotheses are given in 
Table V.
The results of t tests between the extreme means of 
number of choices for each group and condition are found 
in Table VI. It must be taken into consideration with 
these tests of significance that if all the possible com­
parisons with t tests were computed, about one-twentieth 
of them would yield significance by chance alone at the 
.05 level of confidence or better. Therefore, to arbit­
rarily choose the extreme sets of scores to evaluate would 
be to allow data which appears to be significant to actually 
be a result of chance variation of the t function. Edwards 
(16, p.329) quotes Fisher as suggesting that under these 
circumstances the basis for rejecting the null hypotheses
Significance level for first 
Group Condition N choices deviating from chance
I l:Low RV
II l:Low RV
III l:Low RV
IV 1:High RV
III 2:High RV
IV 2: Low RV
III 2:Low RV 
repeated
25 p>.50<.70
25 p>.02<.05
62 p>.01<.02
42 p>.10<.20
26 p>.10<.20
24 P>.30<.50
20 p>.10<.20
Table IV. Table of deviations of first choices from chance
Hypothesis Independent
Variable
Size of 
Table
Groups and Conditions Involved Significance
Level
I Sex 2 x 5 Group IV, Condition 1 
(most discrepant group) 
Males vs. Females
p> .05< .10
II Age 3 x 5 Groups I vs II vs III 
Condition 1
p>.001< .01
III Relative magnitude 
of RV: (Inflation)
1 x 5 Group III, Condition 1 (low RV) 
vs Condition 2 (high RV)
p= .0001
V(
p =.027 0(Deflation) 1 x 5 Group IV, Condition 1 (high RV) 
vs Condition 2 (low RV)
(Separate groups) 2 x 5 Group III, Condition 1 (low RV) 
vs Group IV, Condition 1 (high RV)
p> .02 <.05
I? Increased experience 1 x 5 Group III, Condition 1 (low RV, 
n = 20) vs Condition 2 (re­
peated low RV)
p — .001
Table V. Table of results from chi square analyses of first choices in 
regard to the four experimental hypotheses.
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Graph
Number
Group
Number Condition
Extreme E-RV 
Combinations p values*
VIII I 1 (low RV) S/S and 2/S p>.01<.02
IX II 1 (low RVj 6/S and l/S p>.001<.01
X III 1 (low RV) S/S and 4/S p = .01
XI IV 1 (high RV) S/S and 4/S p — .012
XII III 2 (high RV) S/S and l/S p - .0016
XIII IV 2 (low RV) 6/S and 2/S p — .0004
* The .005 level of confidence necessary to 
reject null hypothesis.
Table VI. P values between extreme low and high mean 
preferences under each experimental group 
and condition.
9$
should not be at the .05 level but at the .05/n level, where 
n is the number of possible comparisons. Even here, Fisher 
suggests, one should be suspicious about the conclusions.
In the data of this study there were 10 possible comparisons 
among the five drawers (E-RV combinations) so the confidence 
level of .005 or better is held as necessary to reject the 
null hypothesis.
The chi square analyses of the degree to which the 
modal choice frequencies differed from chance under each of 
the experimental groups and conditions are given in Appendix 
C. These findings may be compared with similar analyses of 
the first choices in Table IV.
The chi square analyses of modal choice frequencies in 
regard to the four hypotheses are given in Appendix D. These 
results may be compared with the analyses of the first choice 
and frequencies given in Table V.
Occasionally, in the chi square analyses mentioned above, 
a table had an expected magnitude of less than five in parti­
cular cells. Since all of the tdiles are either one, two, or 
three by five, Yates’ correction method could not be used. 
Therefore, whenever a chi square was significant and any ex­
pected frequency was less than five, the table was broken 
down into a number of fourfold contingency tables so that 
Yates’ correction could be used to recheck the significance.
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3. Summary of the results.
As we look through the tables and graphs to see what 
significant findings we have, we are struck with the fact 
that the method of analysis makes a difference in regard to 
whether our results are significant.
For example, let us look first at the degree to which 
choice behavior in the study deviates from what might be 
expected by chance. The first choice method reveals that 
only the first conditions of the fifth graders and Group 
III college students are significant. The modal choice 
method reveals that these two and also the second condi­
tions, inflation and deflation, for the two college groups 
(III and IV) are significant. The extreme means method re­
veals that only the latter two groups and conditions are 
significant. These findings suggest that the first choice 
method may be reflecting something different from the 
extreme means method and that the modal choice method seems 
to be overlapping the other two.
Turning to the first hypothesis we find unanimity between 
the first choice and the modal choice method in that neither 
shows any significant difference between sexes. This find­
ing is true even in the group and conditions which shows 
the greatest discrepency between sexes. This finding is 
advantageous since we can combine sexes while studying the 
remainder of the variables*
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The second hypothesis, regarding differences in choice 
behavior as a function of age, also has inconsistancy among 
the methods. The first choice method reveals significant 
differences as a function of age. The results from the mod­
al choice method fall short of significance.
The third hypothesis, concerning relative magnitude of 
RV, was tested in three different ways: (1) inflating the
RV level with one group, (2) deflating the RV level with 
another group, and (3) comparing two separate groups at 
different levels of RV. Inflating the RV level was found 
to bring significant differences in choice behavior in both 
the first choice and modal choice methods. Deflating the RV 
level brought significant differences in choice behavior with 
the first choice method, but not with the modal choice method. 
The comparison of two separate groups under different levels 
of RV reveals significant differences in first choice fre­
quencies but not with modal choice frequencies.
The fourth hypothesis was in regard to the variable 
of increased Experience. A repetition of the same experi­
ment brings significantly different first choices but not
r
modal choices.
VDISCUSSION
The discussion of the results will emphasize the first 
choice method of analysis. As was mentioned earlier, this 
measure of choice behavior is assuredly free from the 
extraneous influence of successes and failures in the test­
ing period. This extraneous influence may have affected 
the later choices. If so, this would probably have repre­
sented a constant error. On the other hand, the first 
choice method was probably vulnerable to variable error in 
the following way. There was a brief period of inactivity 
just prior to the first choice. This may have allowed the 
subjects to respond more than usual to extraneous cues 
(clinking sound of chips, etc.) and to interpret or mis­
interpret them. If so, he may have responded less to the 
acquired expectancies and values and more to the extraneous 
cues. This would have introduced a great deal of variable 
error for the first choice which would not have been present 
for the later choices, at which time the subjects were 
occupied with handling chips. Therefore, the argument for 
the first choice method is that a possible variable error 
would be less damaging to measurement than a possible 
constant error.
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1. The hypotheses.
As we look for implications from the results, it 
seems clear that the null hypothesis of sex differences 
cannot be rejected. Even in the most discrepant group and 
condition, the difference between males and females fell 
short of significance. On the other hand, the second hy­
pothesis of age differences showed significant results. 
Moreover, the degree to which each age group differed from 
chance increased from fifth grade to eighth grade to col­
lege level. This suggests that the trends in choice be­
havior grow stronger with increase in age. A test of the 
third hypothesis, concerning relative magnitude of RV, 
showed a significant change both when RV level was inflated 
in one group, when it was deflated in another group, and 
when two groups with different RV levels were compared with 
each other. The fourth hypothesis of increased experience 
affecting choice behavior also yielded significant differ­
ences.
2. Free observations
Curvilinearity. What do the trends look like which 
have given significant results? The most outstanding trend 
is the one of curvilinearity. This feature is most notable 
in Graph III in the first choice data. The curve describes 
a preference for extreme E-RV combinations;a lack of pre­
ference for the middle E-RV combinations. An interpretation
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of this curvilinear function was volunteered by Ward Ed­
wards in a personal communication:
In my own experiments I found several factors which 
produced behavior such as you describe (choosing 
the extremes). The first such factor is lack of 
experience with the situation. Such patterns were 
much more common in the first session or two than 
in later sessions. The second such factor was too- 
small stakes. The smaller the stakes (in general), 
the more extreme behavior I saw. The third such 
factor was too large stakes; this effect, however, 
interacted strongly with winning vs. losing. A 
subject who is behind in a big stake situation 
tends either to choose the more cautious alter­
native available in order to avoid losing more or 
else to choose the most risky alternative avail­
able in order to make up his losses. Can any or 
all of these factors have been involved in your 
situation?
The writer would agree that Edwards’ first factor of 
lack of experience would apply to the present experiment.
Ih fact, the significance of the hypothesis of increased 
experience supports this idea. In regard to the second 
factor, however, it is difficult to evaluate how high the 
Bubjects saw the stakes. If Edwards uses the term stakes 
in the same way Coombs does, when indicating the amount the 
subject stands to lose, the subject in the present experi­
ment lost nothing except the effort necessary to open an 
empty drawer. Edwards’ next factor of interaction of choice 
behavior with success and failure does not apply to the 
first choice data. No successes or failures had yet oc­
curred at this point. In regard to the remaining fifteen 
choices, however, the interpretation seems very important.
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The writer felt, while collecting data, that many subjects 
would try for the most risky E-RV combination and then, 
with a few failures, would shift to the most cautious alter­
native. This behavior would readily account for the pile-up 
in frequencies at the extremes.
Another interpretation of what might lead to or contri­
bute to extreme choosing is the individual strategies based 
on the predictability of the E-RV combinations on any single 
given trial. To understand this more clearly, let us examine 
each of the E-RV combinations. The 8/8 drawer could be pre­
dicted by the subjects as having chips 100% of the time ac­
cording to the objective information given in the training 
period. On any single trial the best prediction for the 
6/8 drawer would be that chips would be present in it. How­
ever, this prediction would be true only 75% of the time.
The 4/# drawer could not be predicted any better than chance, 
which was 50% of the time. With the 2/8 and l/8 drawers the 
best prediction on a single given trial would be that chips 
would not be present when either drawer was opened. How­
ever, this prediction would hold true only 75% of the time 
for the 2/8 drawer and 87i% of the time for the 1/8 drawer. 
Thus, Graph XV shows a curvilinear or V-shape function of 
this predictability. If we assume that strategies on the 
part of the subject may have been built on the predictabil­
ity of the drawers, we have a possible explanation for our
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predict­
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Graph XV.
1$%
Probability level
Graph of relationship between predictability on a 
given single trial and the probability level of success 
on the trial.
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data.
It is not possible that a combination of two types of 
strategy may have been used by the subjects. For example, 
a subject may start off by using either the strategy of 
maximizing E or maximizing RV. If he maximizes E and re­
ceives a continual slow income of chips, he may shift his 
strategy and maximize RV. After meeting with frequent 
failure in opening the high RV-low E drawer, he may then 
shift back to the other, more cautious extreme. Thus, 
the subject would seldom settle down to trying any middle 
course strategy.
This type of interpretation seems to give support to 
the arguments in Chapter II in favor of a separate concept 
for value of failure (RV-) and value of success (RV-V).
It would seem that the behavior of people could be usefully 
categorized in terms of whether the strategy is to avoid 
maximum failure or to attain maximum success. With the 
former strategy, to avoid maximum failure, the RV- for 
failing to achieve would presumably be high. With the 
latter strategy, to attain maximum success, the RV-V for 
positive achievement would be high. As a function of per­
sonality variables, one of these strategies might occur 
more often than the other within the same individual. As 
mentioned previously, there are implications here for a
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theory of maladjustment. A person who has extremely pre­
dominant failure-avoidant strategy would surely be con­
sidered "neurotic.” On the other hand, it may be questioned 
as to whether a person who has extreme suecess-attainment 
strategy and who ignores acceptable avoidant behavior, such 
as diplomatic retreat, is not also maladjusted. Actually 
the matter of balance between these two strategies has not 
been thought through carefully. Nevertheless, the approach 
seem®sto be one which is clear cut and amenable to testing 
and possible utility.
Four-eighths preference. As we look again at the 
graphs, we can find, along with the curvilinear function, 
an occasional preference for the 4/3 frequency drawer.
This, if interpreted together with the curvilinearity, 
gives the curve a W-shape. Outstanding examples of this 
are found with the first choices of eighth grades (Graph 
II) and high-RV trained college students (Graph IV). In 
terms of Ward Edwards* results (17)> this would probably 
be interpreted in terms of his probability preferences, 
and, indeed, Graph II would bear out this interpretation 
in that the 6/3 choice frequency is low as well as the 
4/3 being high. The present writer would not reject this 
interpretation, but, on the other hand, he would be caut­
ious about interpreting any of the results from the eighth 
graders (Graphs II and IX). The reasons are that the
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testing situation for the eighth graders was very different f 
from that for the other groups. The eighth graders were test­
ed in unusually cramped conditions in a projection room at 
the back of a gymnasium. Outside the door basketball games 
and loud shouting were taking place throughout the testing. 
During the experiment the subjects made noticably more mis­
takes in terms of misunderstanding instructions and having 
to be corrected. They asked noticably more questions, sug­
gesting suspiciousness. These questions included queries 
as to what the experimenter was up to, what the experiment 
would discover about them personally, and what bearing it 
had on their grades. It is difficult or impossible to 
separate what behavior was a function of age level and 
what was a function of extraneous variables in the situa­
tion. A final reason for cautiousness about the eighth 
grade results is that the graph of first choices (Graph II) 
is in no way similar to the graph of mean number of pre­
ferences for 16 choices (Graph IX). In the latter, the 
trend is toward a more cautious response, and the 4/8 
preference is absent. In contrast to the eighth grade 
group, the graphs of first choices for the other groups 
(Graphs I, III to VII) have at least a small degree of 
similarity to the respective mean preferences graphs 
(Graphs VIII, X to XIV). Therefore, the suggestion is 
offered that final conclusions about the eighth grade group
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must await further experimentation under more favorable 
conditions.
Inflation. Significant differences were found as a 
function of change in RV level from low to high within the 
same group. This change was in a direction away from 
V-shape function of choosing the extremes to a trend to­
ward choosing E-RV combinations on the more cautious side. 
The unusual aspect of this change is that the 6/S and 4/3 
level yielded more choices than the S/3. The only inter­
pretation offered for this observation is that perhaps, 
with an inflation in number of chips, cautious, but not a 
completely riskless, behavior is preferred.
Deflation. When a deflation in the number of chips 
took place in one group, there occurred a clear cut trend 
toward choosing the more cautious or riskless E-RV com­
binations. This trend seems to represent a convenient 
analogue for what happens to human behavior in a period 
of economic depression. When there is less money in cir­
culation, people become less speculative and prefer the 
«sUre-bet" type of income. Although the laboratory 
situation is far removed from the economic situation, the 
similarity noted here may possibly have implications for 
experimental economics.
3. Mat hemat i z ing.
Another way to look at the data is in terms of what it
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may mean in terms of refining the BP formula. Had the 
data been in a more simple form, such as a straight line 
with a slope, the mathematizing would have been a more sim­
ple problem. Nature has not allowed us so simple a solution.
The most outstanding aspect of the data was the curvi­
linearity in the college group level. This factor might be 
incorporated into the formula in the following way:
B.P. = (be36) (U-b)ec(R-v -)) 110)
In this formula BP is the potential for a given behavior 
to occur; b is a relative weighting dependent on the situa­
tional and personality variables which call for caution or 
risk; e is a mathematical constant 2.713; a is a constant 
weighting for RV; and RV is a measure of reinforcement 
value.
The formula has the following descriptive properties:
(l) both E and RV have a growth function relationship with 
BP, thus causing a resultant curvilinear function under dif­
ferent E-RV combinations of constant expected value (see 
Graph XVI), (2) a b weight of .50 will yield a symmetrical 
curve, (3) a b weight above .50 emphasizes the E function 
and withers the RV function, thus describing more cautious 
behavior, (4) a b weight less than .50, by contrast, 
would describe a more risky beha ior.
A note of caution should be made in regard to this 
formula. There is no evidence to show that E and RV are
Ill
Magnitude
of
function
a*-E-RV product 
(BP function)
E function ■RV function
^ "• • • E
RV • • •
Graph XVI* Rough sketch graph of the relationship of E and
RV to BP, assuming E and RV to be growth functions 
of BP*
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definitely growth functions of BP. This is merely one type 
of curve which fits the data parsimoniously. Ultimately, 
the E function would have to be reconciled with the research 
on relation between objective and subjective probability, 
and the RV function would have to be reconciled with the 
work by Friedman and Savage and others on scaling utility.
A second way to mathematize the data is in terms of 
the relation between RV-Y and RV-, which was discussed 
earlier in the chapter. An example formula might be:
BP = f (E & RV-V ) - ((1-E) & RV-) (11)
This would be similar to the Coombs formula (9) except 
for Coombs* gambling and risk conponent. This component 
might be built into the above formula in terms of the 
situational variable.
If one proposed, after the fashion of the von Neumann 
theory, that people choose either to maximize the expected 
gain or else to minimize the maximum loss, then a formula­
tion might be as follows:
BP s (E & RV+ ) or ((1-E)& RVj ) (12)
Thus, the subject in an individual act would behave either 
toward achieving success or avoiding failure. "Outside 
variables" would have to be used in order to predict which
strategy he would assume.
A word in retrospect might be said about all mathemat-
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izing, The major value of mathematizing is that it is a 
clear language by which to describe the relationship be­
tween variables. For example, to say a - f(b) is to say 
that when a increases, b increases, and vice versa. To say 
that a = f(l/c) is to say that when a increases, c decreases, 
and vice versa. To say that a = f (b/c) is to make both the
previous statements at the same time. Once a, b and c are
clearly defined, the communication is quite sharp.
The major caution in regard to mathematizing is to as­
sume the final goal or explanation has been reached when
one expresses the variables in mathematical terms. This is
not true even when one can predict accurately with the 
formula. For example, Newton's second law is described as 
F = ma. To successfully predict the force of an object as 
a function of the product of the mass times the accelera­
tion does not mean full understanding has been obtained.
It merely means that F = ma is a useful language by which 
to express whatever knowledge has thus far been obtained.
To have a formula fail to predict future events, as surely 
will be true in the cases of the formulae we have discussed, 
has the additional advantage of pointing to a problem area 
where more knowledge is needed.
4. Relation to other research.
What relevance might the present study have to other 
pieces of related research? The two studies most closely
U n ­
related. to the present one are by J. Worell (54) and 
Edwards (17). It is evident that the results of the present 
study bear very little similarity to theirs. The differ­
ences in the designs and the testing situations among 
these studies have already been discussed in Chapter II. How­
ever, one added point may be significant in explaining the 
differences. This point is in regard to differences in am­
ounts of probability training. Choices based on E-RY com­
binations may differ as a function of being undertrained 
or overtrained. Defining expectancy in terms of percentage 
of yes guess, Crandall (11) found between 70 and 80 trials 
were needed to train expectancy to the level of objective 
probability in a two choice situation. W. IK. Estes (20), 
has proposed a learning formula which predicts the length 
of this type of probability learning. Differences in 
amount of training did actually occur among the three ex­
periments. Edwards' subjects were the longest trained.
The present study gives firm support to the notion that 
amount of training is an important variable in evaluating 
findings in this area. The hypothesis that increased 
experience would influence choice behavior was found to 
be significant.
5* A backward glance.
In looking lack at the general approach in which this
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research was framed, it seems that the expectancy-reinforce- 
ment value type of theory has a heuristic value which clearly 
excels the progenital theories of "expectancy sans reinforce­
ment" and "reinforcement sans expectancy." The group of 
followers, who by and large seem to be authors and students 
of social learning, decision making, probability learning, 
and economic theory, do not seem to have made more than a 
beginning in the building of the framework for behavior 
prediction which seems possible in this point of view.
CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this study a simple model was set up which assumed 
that choice behavior could be predicted on the basis of 
the product of the objective probability of success and ob­
jective gain from the success. These two predictors were 
interpreted, respectively, in terms of the social learning 
concepts of expectancy (E) and reinforcement value (RV). 
Within a framework where the two predictors varied but 
their product (E-RV combination) remained a constant, the 
variables of sex difference, age difference, relative size 
of objective gain (RV), and increased experience were 
studied experimentally. The purpose of the experiment was 
to see how behavior deviates from the model under the dif­
ferent conditions of the experimental variables.
Twenty-five fifth grade, 25 eighth grade, and 106 
college students, halved in regard to sex, underwent a 
training period of opening five drawers which rendered 
plastic chips in varying probabilities and amounts. Under 
low RV conditions the five drawers had different expect­
ancies of paying off, and, secondly, different amounts of 
chips when they did pay off: (1) S/S (all the time), one 
chip, (2) 6/S of the time, one and one-third chips on the 
average, (3) 4/S (half the time), two chips, (4) 2/S, 
four chips, (5) 1/&> eight chips. The order of pay off
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in the latter four drawers was randomized. The position 
of each drawer was systematically varied from subject to 
subject. In the high RV condition the number of chips 
was always three times greater than the low RV condition.
After the subjects completed 24 training trials with 
each drawer, they were given 16 free choices of any or all 
drawers, with the information that the drawers would con­
tinue to pay off with the same probabilities and amounts 
and that the subjects would receive a given but unspecified 
amount of money for each chip they obtained.
Twenty-four college students repeated the above pro­
cedure under the lew RV condition after having had the 
high RV condition. Twenty-six college students repeated 
under the high RV condition after having had the low RV 
condition. Twenty students, who had the low RV, repeated 
the same condition, Again, the groups were halved in re­
gard to sex.
The major findings based on the first choice in the 
test period were as follows:
1. No significant differences were found in regard to
sex.
2. Significant differences were found as a function 
of age level. The fifth grade choices did not differ 
significantly from chance. The eighth grade and, even 
more so, the college students had choices which differed
11$
significantly from chance. All age groups, especially the 
college group, showed a preference for the extreme E-RV 
combinations. In addition, the eighth grade had a prefer­
ence at 4/3* This combination of extremes and 4/$ prefer­
ence gave a W shape to their curve.
3. Relative magnitude of RV was found to influence 
choice behavior. An inflation in RV level produced a change 
toward more cautious, but not completely riskless, choice 
behavior. A deflation in RV produced a clear gradient of 
preference toward riskless choices with the low steady in­
come (&/$ expectancy). A comparison of two college groups
at different levels of RV indicated the low RV group chose the 
extreme E-RV combinations and the high RV group chose the ex­
treme and also the 4/$ E-RV combination.
4. Significant differences were found as a result of 
increased experience. The direction of this difference was 
toward less extreme choosing.
The results in regard to all (L6 choices differed from 
the first choice results. The differences were interpreted 
in terms of the extraneous influence of successes and fail­
ures during the test period. The results were also dis­
cussed in terms of the different strategies which may have 
been followed by the subject.
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APPENDIX A 
Facsimile of a Data Sheet
Subject # %3
Name 6 e A?/Y/g/___________
Class CIcLvke 17.-00_______________
Group # ///""
Grade FresA yyia.*\
Age
OSPE
/7
Training Order X
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6. 
7.
a.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
1 3 
1'
0 L
I T
1
1“
0“
O'
1'
1"
2"
2"
2'
O'
1"
1"
B
Test Trials
1 IL 1 to 
1 2~
41
4
0"
0"
0"
o'
0"
0"
4"
O'
O'
o'
4
0
4/d i/d a/a 6/a 2/a 4/a i/a
2 y 0 / 3 0 0 6 0
o —
0
OfL.
0 g
3
3
4
4
0
12
0
0
O '
0
0 0 17. 3 4 12 0“ 0
0 0 /s-
3_
4 0 u ~ 0
2 0 3 4 0 6 0
2 0 3 0 0 6 0
2 0 3 0 0 6 0 z
0 o 3 4 0 0“ ~ 0
2 0 3 4 0 6 o
2 0 3 4 2 6 0
2 a— 3 ~ 4 0 6 24
0 0 3 4 0 0““ 0
0 0 3 0 0 0 0
0 0 3 4 12 0 "0
2 a— 3 4 0 6 24--
Ranking 1. 3
2.  L
3.  r
4. ___
5.  v
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APPENDIX B
Table VII. Summary of frequencies of modal choices for various
E-RV combinations.
Group Condition Frequency of Modal Choice for each E-RV combination*
S/S 6/S 4/S 2/S 1/S
I Low RV 6.67 6.33 2.50 5.17 4.33
II Low RV S.00 11.00 1.00 3.50 1.50
III Low RV 22.33 10.17 4.00 14.17 13.33
IV Low RV 12. S3 10.34 5.00 2.50 9.33
III 2: High RV S.00 9.00 6.00 0.50 2.50
IV 2: Low RV 11.00 5.50 2.00 2.50 3.00
III Low RV 6.00 
2: Low RV repeat 6.00
3.50
3.00
3.00
3.50
3.00
1.00
4.50
6.50
* When there is a tie for modal choice, the frequency is divided 
up among those E-RV combinations involved in the tie.
APPENDIX C
Table VIII. Table of deviations of modal 
choices from chance.
Group Condition N Significance level for modal choice
deviating from chance
I 1: low RV 25 p >  .50 < .70
II 1: low RV 25 p > .001<.01
III 1: low RV 62 p > .001 <.01
IV 1: high RV 42 p > .10 < .20
III 2: high RV 26 p >  .10 < .20
IV 2: low RV 24 p > .02 < .05
III 2: low RV 
repeated 20 p > .20 < .50
APPENDIX D
Table IX. Table of results from chi square analyses of modal 
choices in regard to the four experimental 
hypotheses.
Hypothesis Independent 
Variable
Size of 
Table
Groups and Conditions 
Involved
Significance
Level
I Sex 2 x 5 Group II, Condition 1 
(most discrepant group) 
Males vs. Females
p > .20 <.30
II Age 3 x 5 Groups I vs II vs III 
condition 1
p > .10 < .20
III Relative magnitude 
of RV:(Inflation)
1 X 5 Group III,Condition 1 
(low RV) vs Condition 2 
(high RV)
p < .0001
(Deflation) 1 X 5 Group IV, Condition 1 
(high RV) vs Condition2 
(low RV)
p = .56
(separate groups) 2 x 5 Group III, Condition 1 
(low RV) vs Group IV, 
Condition 1 (high RV)
P> .30<.50
I? Increased experience
1 X 5
Group III, Condition 1 
(low RV)(n=20) vs Condi­
tion 2 (repeated low RV)
P = .56
m 
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